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STRATEGIC RULEMAKING DISCLOSURE 
 
Jennifer Nou and Edward H. Stiglitz* 
 
Congressional enactments and executive orders instruct agencies to pub-
lish their anticipated rules in what is known as the Unified Agenda. The Agen-
da’s purpose is to ensure that political actors can monitor regulatory develop-
ment. Agencies have come under fire in recent years, however, for conspicuous 
omissions and irregularities. Critics allege that agencies hide their regulations 
from the public strategically, that is, to thwart potential political opposition. 
Others contend that such behavior is benign, perhaps the inevitable result of 
changing internal priorities or unforeseen events. 
To examine these competing hypotheses, this Article uses a new dataset 
spanning over thirty years of rulemaking (1983-2014). Uniquely, the dataset is 
drawn directly from the Federal Register. The resulting findings confirm that 
agencies substantially under-report their rulemaking activities — about 70 per-
cent of their proposed rules do not appear on the Unified Agenda before publi-
cation. Importantly, agencies also appear to disclose strategically with respect 
to Congress, though not with respect to the President. The Unified Agenda is 
thus not a successful tool for Congress to monitor and influence regulatory de-
velopment. The results suggest that legislative, not executive, innovations may 
help to augment public participation and democratic oversight, though the net 
effects of more transparency remain uncertain. The findings also raise further 
inquiries, such as why Congress does not render disclosure requirements judi-
cially enforceable. 
                                                          
* Neubauer Family Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School, and Assistant Professor of Law 
and Jia Jonathan Zhu and Ruyin Ruby Yu Sesquicentennial Fellow, Cornell Law School, respectively. For 
helpful comments and discussions, many thanks to Nicholas Almendares, Steven Balla, Josh Chafetz, Tom 
Clark, Curtis Copeland, Cynthia Farina, William Hubbard, Kim Krawiec, Saul Levmore, Michael Livermore, 
Jonathan Masur, Tom McGarity, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Eric Posner, Jeff Rachlinksi, Connor Raso, Stuart 
Shapiro, Wendy Wagner, and William West, as well as to workshop participants at Cornell Law School, the 
Conference of Empirical Legal Studies, and the NYU Conference on Political Economy and Public Law. 
Thanks also to Emmanuel Arnaud, Ariel Atlas, Caitlin Lucey and Paul Rogerson for outstanding research 
assistance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The regulatory process begins long before the notice of proposed rulemak-
ing makes its public appearance. Drafting a proposed rule can take months, 
even years, of internal debate and effort.1 Agency staff must draft regulatory 
text along with legal justifications and cost-benefit analyses. They must thus 
gather the requisite data to make informed decisions. For this purpose, agencies 
often invite informal input from potentially-affected interest groups and regu-
lated entities.2 These interactions, however, are often “informal and idiosyncrat-
                                                          
1 See William F. West, Formal Procedures, Informal Processes, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Bu-
reaucratic Policy Making: An Institutional Policy Analysis, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 66, 69-70 (2004) (finding 
that average length of the proposal development period for the study’s 42 rules was more than 5 years). 
2 See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE 
LAW AND POLICY 75-82 (4th ed. 2011); Cary Coglianese, Richard Zeckhauser & Edward Parson, Seeking 
Truth for Power: Informational Strategy and Regulatory Policymaking, 89 MINN. L. REV. 277, 281-85 
(2004); West, supra note 1 at 69-70; Wendy Wagner et. al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of 
EPA's Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 110-13 (2011); William F. West, Inside the 
Black Box: The Development of Proposed Rules and the Limits of Procedural Controls, 41 ADMIN. & SOC’Y 
576, 577 (2009) [hereinafter Black Box]. 
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ic.”3 They can range from meetings with stakeholders to casual phone calls 
with individual contacts.4 These communications are rarely public and often 
occur behind the scenes.5 
Yet this stage of the rulemaking process — when agencies formulate their 
agendas and policy proposals — is one of the most critical.6 Determining which 
regulatory options are on-screen and off can shape the remainder of the rule-
making. Because of the pre-proposal period’s importance, both Congress and 
the President have required agencies to notify the public more generally about 
rules in the pipeline. In particular, these statutes and executive orders instruct 
rulemaking agencies to publish their regulatory agendas every fall and spring, 
essentially the regulations they anticipate issuing in the near future. Generally 
speaking, these agenda entries should reveal planned regulatory actions for the 
upcoming year, though agencies can disclose more long-term efforts as well.7 
The Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC) then compiles these indi-
vidual agendas into what is known as the Unified Agenda of Regulatory and 
Deregulatory Actions (“Unified Agenda”). 
Agencies have recently come under fire, however, for conspicuous omis-
sions and irregularities.8 Under President George W. Bush, Democratic legisla-
tors questioned the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s failure to 
include a regulation regarding risk assessments in the Agenda as “highly unu-
                                                          
3 West, Black Box, supra note 2, at  577. 
4 See id. at 591. 
5 See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Don’t “Screw Joe the Plumber”: Sausage Making of Financial Reform, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 53, 71 (2013) (noting that “research on the preproposal stage of the rule development process 
has traditionally been impeded by a lack of information; Administrative Procedure Act docketing and other 
transparency requirements are generally limited to the period after publication of the proposed rule”). 
6 Cary Coglianese & Daniel E. Walters, Agenda-Setting in the Regulatory State: Theory and Evidence, 67 
ADMIN L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 2) (noting that the state preceding rule promulgation and 
enforcement “is one where some of the most critical decisions are made to define what issues will eventually 
make it to the important later stages of [the regulatory process]”). 
7 “The activities included in individual agency agendas are primarily those currently planned to have an Ad-
vance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), or a Final 
Rule issued within the next 12 months. However, to keep users better informed of opportunities for participa-
tion in the rulemaking process, an agency may list in the "Long-Term Actions" section of its agenda those 
rules it expects will have the next regulatory action more than 12 months after publication of the agenda.” 
OFFICE OF INFO. AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, ABOUT THE UNIFIED AGENDA, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_About.jsp (last visited Feb. 24, 2016). 
8 CURTIS W. COPELAND, THE UNIFIED AGENDA: PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 11-14 (April 13, 2015) (compiling 
examples) (hereinafter, UNIFIED AGENDA REFORM, 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Draft%20Report%20041315%20
FINAL_0.pdf. 
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sual.”9 The Government Accountability Office found numerous errors in sam-
ples prepared by prominent agencies, including entries that should have ap-
peared in previous editions of the Agenda, entries that reported the wrong date 
of regulatory action or entries that otherwise incorrectly reported the status of 
rules.10 Similarly, the Congressional Research Service and the Administrative 
Conference of the United States, in work spearheaded by Curtis Copeland, re-
vealed that a substantial fraction of “significant” proposed rules was not pre-
ceded by an agenda entry.11 Copeland’s most recent work also finds that a 
number of “significant” final rules were published in the first half of 2014 
without notice in the Unified Agenda.12 
Republican committee members and other observers have also criticized 
President Obama’s administration for not publishing a separate spring and fall 
Agenda. Instead, the Unified Agenda was released as an unprecedented single 
edition just days before Christmas.13 The spring agenda the following year was 
not published until the summer.14 Interest groups and legislators accordingly 
                                                          
9 Key Lawmakers Question OSHA’s Secrecy in Drafting Risk Assessment Rule, INSIDEOSHAONLINE (Inside 
Wash. Publishers, Wash. D.C.), July 21, 2008, at 1. 
10 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-1024 R., ACCURACY OF INFORMATION IN THE UNIFIED 
AGENDA (2001). More specifically, the GAO study analyzed a sample of agendas prepared by the Depart-
ments of Commerce and Health and Human Services (HHS), the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for April and October of 1999 and 2000, as well 
as for April 2001. Id. 
11 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE UNIFIED AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR RULEMAKING TRANSPARENCY AND PARTICIPATION 8 (2009) (from a sample of 231 significant proposed 
rules in 2008, finding that “there were no ‘proposed rule’ Unified Agenda entries for about one-quarter of the 
proposed rules before they were published in the Federal Register”); COPELAND, supra note 8 at 43-44 (from 
a sample of 88 significant proposed rules from the first half of 2014, finding that 94% were “preceded by a 
‘proposed rule stage’ entry in the previous edition of the Unified Agenda”). In addition, out of 22 likely-
significant rules from independent agencies during the same time period, Copeland finds that “only seven 
(32%) of the 22 proposed rules examined had any . . . prior agenda entry”). 
12 Id. at 50 (from a sample of 55 significant final rules from the first half of 2014, finding that one-quarter 
were not “immediately preceded by a ‘final rule stage’ entry in the Unified Agenda”). As for independent 
agencies during the same time period, Copeland examines 20 potentially significant rules and finds that “only 
7 (35%) had ‘final rule stage’ entries in the preceding Unified Agenda.” Id. at 53. 
13 Press Release, Education and the Workforce Committee, Committee Leaders Request Information on 
Agencies’ Missing Regulatory Agendas, (May 24, 2013). See also Hester Peirce, More Sensible Regulations 
Require Predictable Disclosure (Jan. 3, 2013), 
http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2013/01/03/more_sensible_regulations_require_predictable_disclos
ure_100067.html (“The Spring 2012 edition was never released, thus breaking a nearly two-decade practice 
of agencies telling the public twice a year which regulations are under consideration.”); Wayne Crews & 
Ryan Young, Missing: Regulatory Transparency (Oct. 11, 2012), THE DAILY CALLER, 
http://dailycaller.com/2012/10/11/missing-regulatory-transparency/. 
14 Unified Agenda: 3,503 Federal Regulations, 739 affecting small businesses, SENSIBLE REGULATIONS, 
(Jul. 7, 2013) http://www.sensibleregulations.org/2013/07/unified-agenda-3503-federal-regulations-739-
affecting-small-businesses/. 
 5 
 
charged agencies with playing regulatory hide and seek.15 One accusation was 
that agencies were releasing their agendas during time periods — such as the 
holidays or the summer — when external monitors were less likely to pay at-
tention.16 Another claim was that agencies were acting strategically to keep 
regulations off the radar for as long as possible. The longer an agency could 
shield its internal machinations, the less time those opposed to the rule would 
have to mobilize against it. Indeed, Professors Jacob Gersen and Anne 
O’Connell posit that agencies often raise the monitoring costs for their oppo-
nents in just this manner.17 Specifically, they point out that agencies can game 
the release of regulatory decisions to raise monitoring costs, particularly for 
those actions that are less regularly monitored such as rule withdrawals.18 
The prospect of strategic disclosure by agencies is troubling in large part 
because of the Unified Agenda’s intended function: to alert monitors and inter-
ested parties of an agency’s regulatory activity before it publishes its notice of 
proposed rulemaking (NPRM).19 This worry is heightened given that the most 
significant policy decisions may be made during this stage of regulatory devel-
opment.20 Such concerns mirror those in other contexts of potentially strategic 
disclosure such as in patent filings,21 graduate school rankings,22 and corporate 
communications.23 Many interest groups and trade associations indeed rely on 
                                                          
15 Id. 
16 See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., Big Sexy Holiday Fun With the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulations, 
FORBES (Dec. 2, 2013) http://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2013/12/02/big-sexy-holiday-fun-with-the-
unified-agenda-of-federal-regulations/ 
17 See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Hiding in Plain Sight? Timing and Transparency in the 
Administrative State, 76 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1157, 1173–1175 (2009). 
18 Id. at 1185. 
19 See infra Part I. See also, Letter from James W. Conrad, Jr., Chair of Section of Administrative Law and 
Regulatory Practice, A.B.A., to Boris Bershteyn, Acting Administrator, Office of Info. And Regulatory Af-
fairs, (Nov. 30, 2012) (noting that “[T]he Unified Regulatory Agenda is an integral part of the Federal regula-
tory process. Its semiannual publication enables regulated entities, consumers, workers, and other interested 
persons to understand and prepare for new rules that are planned or under development. As the Section noted 
in its 2000 Report to the President-Elect, the Agenda ‘provides important information to agency heads, cen-
tralized reviewers, and the public at large, thereby serving the values of open government.’ The timeliness of 
its publication is especially important given that the information it contains is not updated consistently in any 
other fashion.”).  
20 See infra Part I.  
21 See, e.g., Scott Baker & Claudio Mezzetti, Disclosure as a Strategy in the Patent Race, 48 J.L. & Econ. 
173 (2005). 
22 See, e.g., Michael Luca & Jonathan Smith, Strategic Disclosure: The Case of Business School Rankings, 
112 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 17 (2015). 
23 See, e.g., Richard Whittington & Basak Yakis-Douglas, Strategic Disclosure: Strategy as a Form of Repu-
tation Management, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE REPUTATION 402 (Michael L. Barnett & 
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the Agenda to monitor rules of concern. Curtis Copeland reports, for example, 
that the Associated General Contractors of America, various financial industry 
publications, and consulting firms use the Unified Agenda to identify upcoming 
rules of interest.24 More public consumers also include members of Congress, 
the Congressional Research Service, and the Office of Federal Register.25  
At the same time, what is currently known about the actual determinants 
of agency disclosure behavior during this critical pre-proposal phase is still fair-
ly limited.26 Efforts to shed light on the relevant dynamics have, until now, 
mostly relied on limited samples from select agencies — hampered by the lack 
of useable data with which to make more general observations. As others have 
noted, further research is needed not only about why agencies would disclose 
their agendas, but also how they set these agendas in the first place.27 Agenda-
formation is likely to be influenced by a host of factors, including the respective 
priorities of appointed agency heads;28 mandatory statutory requirements;29 as 
well as the preferences of political monitors and external interest groups.30 
More broadly, the bulk of existing empirical work in administrative law 
focuses on how agencies approach the notice and comment process — the peri-
od after the agency promulgates its proposed rule. Recent work, for example, 
has examined the extent to which agencies shun rulemaking altogether,31 stra-
                                                                                                                                             
Timothy G. Pollock, eds., 2012); Jeffrey T. Doyle & Matthew J. Magilke, The Timing of Earnings An-
nouncements: An Examination of the Strategic Disclosure Hypothesis, 84 ACCOUNTING REV. 157 (2009). 
24 See COPELAND, supra note8, at 10 (noting that Associated General Contractors of America, financial in-
dustry publications, and consulting firms use the Unified Agenda to identify upcoming rules of interest). 
25 Id. 
26 See COPELAND, supra note 11, at 8 (noting unawareness “of any studies examining the extent to which 
federal agencies’ proposed rules were, in fact, preceded by ‘proposed rule’ entries in the Unified Agenda”); 
Steven J. Groseclose, Reinventing the Regulatory Agenda: Conclusions from an Empirical Study of EPA’s 
Clean Air Act Rulemaking Progress Projections, 53 MD. L. REV. 521, 545, (1994) (noting need for more sys-
tematic study of question).  
27 See, e.g., Coglianese and Walters, supra note 6, at 2 (“[R]egulatory agenda-setting merits careful analysis 
and systemic study.”); William F. West & Connor Raso, Who Shapes the Rulemaking Agenda? Implications 
for Bureaucratic Responsiveness and Bureaucratic Control, 23 J. PUB. ADMIN RES. & THEORY 495, 495 
(2012) (noting that “[s]cholars have neglected a critical stage of the administrative process,” namely, the 
agency’s “decision to begin developing a rule”). 
28 See Coglianese &Walters, supra note 6, at 9. 
29 West & Raso, supra note 25, at 495 (finding that the “vast majority” of rules in their sample were required 
by Congress). 
30 See Coglianese &Walters, supra note 6, at 9-17. 
31 See Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examina-
tion of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950-1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1440 (2012) (hy-
pothesizing that since “notice and comment rulemaking has become more costly since the mid-1970s, agen-
cies will fail to utilize notice and comment as much as they should”). 
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tegically channel their efforts into other policymaking forms,32 use the rulemak-
ing process to engage particular interest groups to their advantage,33 raise moni-
toring costs,34 or manipulate the length of their comment periods.35 Compara-
tively lacking are efforts to better understand agency choices before a proposed 
rule appears to the public.36 
This Article uses a new dataset obtained from over thirty years of rulemak-
ing and across a wide range of agencies to test empirically whether agencies 
strategically disclose on the Unified Agenda. Uniquely, the dataset draws di-
rectly from the Federal Register, which is the government’s “official daily pub-
lication for rules, proposed rules, and notices of Federal agencies and organiza-
tions.”37 Since agencies must publish in its pages for their rules to gain legal 
effect, the Federal Register provides the most comprehensive look possible at 
agencies’ rulemaking behavior.38 By contrast, virtually all contemporary empir-
ical work on bureaucratic behavior relies on agencies’ self-reporting in the Uni-
                                                          
32 See generally, Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Ve-
hicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Edward H. Stiglitz, Expertise and Agencies Choices over Poli-
cymaking Form: The Strategic Substitution Effect  (unpublished manuscript) (Oct.. 30, 2011) (on file with 
author). 
33 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Pol-
icy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 444 (1989) 
[hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process]; Mathew R. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 264-71 
(1987) [hereinafter McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments]; Mathew D. McCubbins & 
Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 165, 166 (1984). 
34 See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1174. 
35 Rachel Augustine Potter, Procedural Politicking: Agency Risk Management in the Federal Rulemaking 
Process (Empirical Stud. Rulemaking Conf./Univ. Wis., Madison, Wis.), Feb. 20, 2015, at 2. 
36 Note that this gap in the literature is matched by a gap in the law: very little of administrative law address-
es the phase of a rulemaking process in which agencies, in fact, make fundamental choices about the contents 
of rules. See Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Lost World of Administrative Law, 92 TEX. L. 
REV. 1137, 1140 (2014) (arguing that “the actual workings of the administrative state have increasingly di-
verged from the assumptions animating the APA and classic judicial decisions that followed”). 
37 About Federal Register,U.S. GOV’T PUB. OFFICE, http://www.gpo.gov/help/about_federal_register.htm 
(last visited Feb. 24, 2016).  
38 44 U.S.C. § 1507 (2012). Anne Joseph O'Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait 
of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 928 (2008) (“Publication in the Federal Register is 
the official means of notifying the public of new regulations, and agency activity cannot be hidden if agencies 
expect anyone to comply with their rules.”); Randy S. Springer, Note, Gatekeeping and the Federal Register: 
An Analysis of the Publication Requirement of Section 552(a)(1)(D) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 41 
ADMIN. L. REV. 533, 544 (1989) (“Agency documents that fall within the provisions of the publication rule of 
section 552(a)(1)(D) and are not so published are ineffective against a party without actual notice.”). As we 
will discuss, while agencies face little consequence for omitting entries from the Unified Agenda, they are 
legally required to publish their proposed and final rules in the Federal Register short of providing actual 
notice to the relevant parties.  
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fied Agenda,39 which our results suggest is substantially under inclusive. One 
hope is that this dataset improves the current state of the art. 
Our empirical results reveal three main findings. First, agencies only re-
port, on average, about 28 percent of their proposed rules. In other words, 
roughly 72 percent of proposed rules are not contained in the Unified Agenda. 
Second, this underreporting is sensitive to the congressional oversight environ-
ment, especially for those rules that are likely to be more substantial. In particu-
lar, when the President and Congress are from different parties, executive agen-
cies are less likely to publicly report their planned regulatory activities. 
Notably, this effect does not seem to hold for independent agencies, over which 
the president has less control. Third, and relatedly, there is little evidence of 
strategic disclosure with respect to the President. Our evidence is tentative here, 
but even when agency heads are expected to have different policy preferences 
from the President, they do not appear to strategically hide their rules from the 
Unified Agenda. We suspect this is due in part to the President’s superior abil-
ity, relative to Congress, to obtain information about regulatory development 
through more informal means of communications within the executive branch. 
Perhaps the most important normative implication of our findings is that 
                                                          
39 See O’Connell, supra note 36, at 927 n. 108 (noting that “[a]lthough they provide a critical perspective on 
the administrative state, the Unified Agenda are not perfect; they need confirmatory research.”). For examples 
of studies relying on the Unified Agenda database, see, Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule 
Making and the Time It Takes to Develop Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS, 187-206 
(George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds. 2003); Alex Acs & Charles M. Cameron, Does White House 
Regulatory Review Produce a Chilling Effect and ‘OIRA Avoidance’ in the Agencies, 43 PRESIDENTIAL 
STUD. Q. 443 (2013); Steven J. Balla, Political Control, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Public Commenting on 
Agency Regulations, PUB. ADMIN. 1 (2014); Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The 
Contours of Public Participation in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S: J. L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 59, 70 (2005) 
(noting that “the use of the Unified Agenda ensures that the set of rulemakings under study represents as 
complete a snapshot as possible of [Department of Transportation rulemaking activities]”); Jack M. Beer-
mann, Midnight Rules: A Reform Agenda, 2 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 285 (2013); Gersen & O'Connell, 
supra note 17, at 1177; Stephen M. Johnson, Ossification’s Demise? An Empirical Analysis of EPA Rulemak-
ing from 2001-2005, 38 ENVTL. L. 767, 780-81 (2008); Jason M. Loring & Liam R. Roth, After Midnight: 
The Durability of the Midnight Regulations Passed by the Two Previous Outgoing Administrations, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1441, 1454-55 (2005); Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1007-08 (2011); Mi-
chael R. See, Willful Blindness: Federal Agencies’ Failure to Comply with the Regulatory Flexibility Act’s 
Periodic Review Requirement-And Current Proposals to Invigorate the Act, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1199, 
1217-19 (2006); Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process: A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the 
Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J.L. & POL. 393, 400-01 (2007); Edward H. Stiglitz, Unaccounta-
ble Midnight Rulemaking? A Normatively Informative Assessment, 17 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 
156 (2014); Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 123-36; Susan Webb Yackee, The Politics of Ex Parte Lobbying: 
Pre-proposal Agenda Building and Blocking During Agency Rulemaking, 22 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 
373, 379 (2012); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and Bureaucratic 
Performance: Is Federal Rule-making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. THEORY 261, 267-68 (2006). 
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Congress currently lacks an effective information-forcing mechanism with 
which to monitor agencies before they release their proposed rules. The existing 
mechanism becomes even less reliable when it arguably matters the most: when 
Congress and the President are from different political parties. For the same 
reason, there is also no dependable means for interest groups to alert resource-
constrained legislative committees before the rule is proposed.40 The phenome-
non also raises the possibility that agencies could skew which interest groups 
will mobilize in reaction to their proposed rules. Agencies might do this by se-
lectively disclosing those regulations that will benefit its mission-oriented con-
stituents, while hiding those that will rally their detractors. These dynamics, in 
turn, raise additional concerns about the extent to which less well-resourced 
groups that lack access to agency decision-making through informal means can 
meaningfully participate in the regulatory process.41 
Part I provides background on the Unified Agenda and a motivating theory 
for the monitoring function that it serves for political overseers and interest 
groups. Part II, in turn, presents our empirical findings on the extent to which 
agencies disclose their regulatory activities strategically with respect to con-
gressional oversight. In light of the resulting normative concerns, Part III sug-
gests some ameliorative legislative responses. Specifically, Congress could 
amend the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) to require that agencies issue 
judicially enforceable advance notices of proposed rulemaking with a good 
cause exception, or else narrow the logical outgrowth doctrine. Such reforms 
could help to restore the ability of political monitors and interest groups to par-
ticipate more meaningfully in the regulatory development process. 
 
I.  MONITORING REGULATORY DEVELOPMENT 
Both Congress and the President have issued a number of statutes and ex-
ecutive orders that, together, mandate agencies to disclose their planned regula-
tory activities for the upcoming year. This Part provides background for these 
disclosure requirements and grounds them in a well-known theory regarding the 
function of administrative procedures — ensuring that political actors can mon-
itor the regulatory development process. 
                                                          
40 See McCubbins & Schwartz, supra note 31 at 175-76. 
41 See Krawiec, supra note 5 at 77-78; Wagner et al., supra note 2 at 106-109. 
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A.  Monitoring Function 
Presidents and Congress face a common dilemma. They need agencies to 
carry out important public policies, but agencies have superior information for 
how to do so. Executive and legislative overseers, in other words, suffer from 
an information asymmetry. As a result, there is a danger that the agency’s pref-
erence will prevail over those of democratically-elected representatives. More-
over, the technical nature of many regulations, along with the sheer volume of 
rules produced, render it challenging for political principals to know what is 
happening in the bureaucracy, much less to influence or control it. 
Under a familiar view developed by three positive political theorists col-
lectively known as “McNollgast,”42 administrative procedures represent one so-
lution to this information problem. Perhaps most centrally, the APA’s notice-
and-comment process forces agencies to reveal their contemplated regulations 
before imposing final versions of them. Congress can thus intervene in a timely 
manner, whether through hearings, budgetary threats or other forms of influ-
ence. Note that Congress itself does not have to actively monitor the agencies. 
Instead, it can shift these monitoring costs onto motivated third parties. These 
regulated entities and interest groups, in turn, can use public notices of pro-
posed rulemakings to alert sympathetic legislative committee members of prob-
lematic rules. They may do so through various avenues, such as constituent let-
ters, protests, or lobbying.43 
One wrinkle in this story, however, is the common view that, in practice, 
many substantive policy decisions happen before the agency publishes the no-
tice of proposed rulemaking.44 Although this account is contested,45 interest 
                                                          
42 See McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 33, at 244; McNollgast, Structure 
and Process, supra note 33, at 442. 
43 McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 33, at 254. 
44 See infra Part I.B. 
45 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Keynote Address at the Brookings Institution: The Future of E-rulemaking: Pro-
moting Public Participation and Efficiency. (Nov. 30, 2010) (arguing that “proposed rules are a way of ob-
taining comments on rules and the comments are taken exceedingly seriously”). Part of the challenge in as-
sessing these divergent views is that it is not clear that the accounts share a common baseline. Sunstein may 
be right that agencies take the comments seriously, and the reports of interest groups may also be right that 
most of the substantive decisions occur before the notice. For example, suppose that 80 percent, in some rele-
vant sense, of the eventual rule is “determined” before the notice and that 20 percent is responsive to com-
ments. In this scenario, observing that agencies take comments seriously does not undermine the view that 
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groups report regarding proposed rules as a “done deal,” noting that there is less 
“wiggle room” for revisions once the NPRM appears.46 Similarly, former gen-
eral counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) Don Elliott has 
likened the comment process to Kabuki theater, a “highly stylized process for 
displaying in a formal way the essence of something which in real life takes 
place in other venues.”47 Notice-and-comment, in this view, is simply a for-
mality used to ratify decisions that have already been made by the agency or 
negotiated during executive review.48 The available empirical evidence on the 
issue is mixed. Some small-sample studies find that rules change from proposal 
to final stage sufficiently enough to conclude that the notice-and-comment pro-
cess is consequential.49 Other efforts, also based on small samples, find that the 
changes are minor — such as semantic changes or revised effective dates — 
and thus do not implicate central policy choices already made in the proposed 
rule.50 
The magnitude of the changes wrought by the notice-and-comment pro-
cess may thus still be an open question, but what is important for our purposes 
are the incentives agencies currently have to release close-to-final proposed 
rules.51 Perhaps the most consequential development has been how courts have 
determined what constitutes adequate notice under the APA. Specifically, 
courts require final rules to be a “logical outgrowth” of the notice of proposed 
                                                                                                                                             
most fundamental policy choices occur prior to notice, and observing that a rule is a “done deal,” in a manner, 
prior to notice does not undermine the view that agencies take the comment process seriously.  
46 Sara Rinfret, Changing the Rules: Interest Groups and Federal Environmental Rulemaking 166 (Aug. 13, 
2009) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Northern Arizona University) (on file with authors). See also, 
CORNELIUS M. KERWIN & SCOTT R. FURLONG, RULEMAKING 195-96 (4th ed. 2011) (reporting results from 
a survey of interest group participants, showing that they perceive pre-notice contacts to be most effective in 
influencing rule development).  
47 E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 (1992). 
48 See Simon F. Haeder & Susan Yackee, Influence and the Administrative Process: Lobbying the U.S. Pres-
ident's Office of Management and Budget, 109 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 507, 518 (2015) (finding evidence that 
lobbying by business groups, but not public interest groups, results in changes during OIRA regulatory re-
view). 
49 See, e.g., Steven J. Balla, Administrative Procedures and the Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 
92 AMER. POL. SCI. REV. 663, 663-673 (1998); Susan W. Yackee, Sweet-Talking the Fourth Branch: As-
sessing the Influence of Interest Group Comments on Federal Agency Rulemaking. 16 J. PUBLIC ADMIN. RES. 
& THEORY, 103, 103-124 (2006). 
50 See, e.g., Marissa M. Golden, Interest Groups in the Rulemaking Process: Who Participates? Whose Voic-
es Get Heard? 8 J. OF PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY, 245, 245-270 (1998); West, supra note 1, at 68. 
51 See Lisa Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1757 (2007) 
(noting that the APA “no longer serves the informational function contemplated by its drafters; indeed, 
“[a]lthough the APA reflects a political compromise, the Court has not understood it as restricted to the origi-
nal bargain — that is, as providing serious constraints only for formal adjudication and not for other forms of 
agency action.”) 
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rulemaking. In essence, this requirement mandates that an agency’s final rule 
must have been reasonably foreseeable by interested parties.52 A rule will cor-
respondingly be set aside if “interested parties would have had to divine the 
agency’s unspoken thoughts, because the final rule was surprisingly distant 
from the proposed rule.”53 The notice of proposed rulemaking, that is, must be 
detailed and specific enough to alert potential commentators that their interests 
are at stake. A number of recent D.C. Circuit cases suggest that the doctrine is 
still alive and well.54 
At the same time, courts have required agencies to disclose in their notices 
the key data and studies they relied upon to formulate their proposals.55 Conse-
quently, the function of the proposal has evolved from genuinely providing no-
tice to the public about contemplated regulatory actions to, instead, creating a 
rulemaking record suitable for judicial review.56 The purpose of the proposed 
rule, in other words, is no longer to invite public comments and to gather in-
formation on a contemplated rulemaking.  
Rather, it is the opening salvo in anticipated litigation on what is increas-
ingly likely to amount to the final rule.57 Resulting from these dynamics is an 
increased pressure on agencies to shift their actual information gathering to be-
fore the notice-and-comment period to reduce the litigation risks arising from 
the rulemaking record.58 
 
                                                          
52 See, e.g., Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741, 759 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task 
Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
53 CSX Transp., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
54 See, e.g., Envtl. Integrity Project v. EPA, 425 F.3d 992, 993 (D.C. Cir. 2005); CSX Transp., Inc. v. Sur-
face Transp. Bd., 584 F.3d 1076, 1083, (D.C. Cir. 2009); Ass'n of Private Sector Colleges & Univs. v. Dun-
can, 681 F.3d 427, 435 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Allina Health Servs. v. Sebelius, 746 F.3d 1102, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 
2014). 
55 See, e.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 252 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that 
agency must provide all information material to its proposal in order to facilitate adequate public comment). 
See also MARTIN SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION 46-49 
(1988) (discussing ways in which courts required agencies to create record to facilitate interest group in-
volvement and eventual review). 
56 See Elliott, supra note 45, at 1492, (“What was once (perhaps) a means for securing public input into 
agency decisions has become today primarily a method for compiling a record for judicial review.”). 
57 See Jack M. Beermann & Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 899 
(2007); Wagner et al., supra note 2, at 110 (noting that “if a rule is to survive judicial review, it must essen-
tially be in final form at the proposed rule stage”).  
58 Id. at 110-11. 
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B.  The Unified Agenda 
Against this backdrop, it is understandable, then, that political principals 
would search for alternative means to become informed about what agencies 
are contemplating before they release their proposed rules. Indeed, One way to 
understand pre-proposal notification requirements like the Unified Agenda is as 
a legislative and executive branch substitute for the APA. Because the APA’s 
judicialization has blunted the information-forcing value of the statute, regula-
tory agendas represent an effort by political overseers to reassert their ability to 
monitor agency rule development. By granting interest groups early notice 
about regulations on the radar, such groups can, once again, help political prin-
cipals to monitor the bureaucracy effectively. 
Political principals benefit from pre-notice information in several ways. 
First, such information facilitates relatively low-cost interventions into the 
rulemaking process. During the early stages of regulatory development, overse-
ers may induce agency responsiveness with modest and low-visibility interven-
tions such as informal meetings or staff-level phone calls that are less effective 
once the agency has published an NPRM. Second, McNollgast points out that if 
agencies are allowed to present Congress or the President with a fait accompli, 
agencies may be able to design the rule to upset legislative coalitions that might 
otherwise oppose the regulation.59 Hence, early warning systems are critical for 
allowing intervention before the agency has developed a rule that can pick off 
members of such alliances.60 
President Carter first ordered the publication of a semi-annual regulatory 
agenda in 1978 to give the public “adequate notice” of “significant” regulations 
that were “under development or review” at executive agencies.61 What counted 
as “significant” under the order was left to agency discretion but included the 
consequences and burdens of a rule on individuals, businesses, and state and 
local governments.62 For these rules, agencies were not expected to provide 
precise timetables of predicted rulemakings but rather enough information to 
                                                          
59 McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 33, at 434-44; Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1163 
(noting that strategic agency behavior “can allow the monitored to choose the monitors”). 
60 Id. 
61 Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661, 12,661 (Mar. 24,1978). 
62 Id.. 
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describe the essential substance of a contemplated agency action.63 
Two years later, Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act 
(“RFA”).64 The Act’s legislative history suggests that the statute was intended 
only to supplement the executive order. Its narrower aim was to require agen-
cies to consider the impact of their regulations on small businesses and to im-
prove public participation accordingly.65 The statute also extended the agenda 
requirement to independent regulatory agencies,66 mandating that all agencies 
publish an annual regulatory agenda in October and April for rules “likely to 
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.”67 
The agendas had to contain an “approximate schedule” for the agency action.68 
Agencies were then called upon to send these agendas to the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) for comment, as well as to other representatives of small 
businesses.69 In this manner, while the executive order granted agencies sub-
stantial discretion in terms of when and what to publish, the new statute height-
ened the substantive and timing requirements for those regulations salient to 
small businesses. 
Shortly after the RFA was passed, President Reagan revoked Carter’s ex-
ecutive order and issued his own.70 Among other things, Reagan’s order ex-
panded the RFA by requiring both independent and executive agencies to sub-
mit agenda items for all proposed regulations that agencies expected to issue, 
not just those expected to impact small businesses.71 These requirements were 
later reinforced by President Clinton’s own executive order, which similarly re-
quired all agencies to “prepare an agenda of all regulations under development 
or review.”72 The order further charged the Office of Information and Regulato-
ry Affairs (OIRA) with specifying the “time and manner” in which the Unified 
                                                          
63 Id. (“At a minimum, each published agenda shall describe the regulations being considered by the agency, 
the need for and the legal basis for the action being taken, and the status of regulations previously listed on 
the agenda.”). 
64 5 U.S.C. §§ 601–612 (2012). 
65 S. REP. NO. 96-878, at 1-2 (1980) reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2788, 2788-89. 
66 Id at 2. 
67 § 601(a)(1). 
68 5 U.S.C. § 602(c)(2) (1980). 
69 5 U.S.C. § 602(b), (c). 
70 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2000). 
71 Id. § 5(a). 
72 Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993). Each agenda entry, in turn, is required to contain 
“a regulation, identifier number, a brief summary of the action, the legal authority for the action, any legal 
deadline for the action, and the name and telephone number of a knowledgeable agency official.” Id. 
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Agenda was compiled.73 In recent years, OIRA has issued calls for data any-
where from three to six months before the Unified Agenda’s publication; many 
agencies, however, begin to prepare their agenda entries beforehand, while oth-
ers update them after submission, and even publication, deadlines.74  
 These agenda entries usually include the agency’s name, a short de-
scription of the rule along with its title, as well as the agency’s priority desig-
nations — roughly, whether the agency believes the action to be non-
significant, significant, or economically significant.75 The entries also provide 
the legal basis for the rule, an agency contact, an estimated schedule for the 
rulemaking, and whether the rule is expected to affect various interests such as 
states, small businesses, or other countries. Finally, upon its first appearance in 
the Unified Agenda, each rule is also assigned a Regulation Identifier Number 
(RIN), which is designed to allow the public to track the entry through the vari-
ous stages of the rulemaking process.76 A sample Unified Agenda entry can be 
found in Appendix A. After agencies submit their draft agendas, OIRA may 
then send comments or questions back to the agency regarding the content or 
anticipated timing of regulations.77 For the most part, OIRA’s review is highly 
deferential and generally allows agencies to determine the final content.78 
                                                          
73 Id. 
74 COPELAND, supra note 8, at 23-24. 
75 More specifically, agencies can prioritize the rule as: (1) “Economically Significant”; (2) “Other Signifi-
cant” “[t]his category “includes rules that the agency anticipates will be reviewed under Executive Order 
12866 or rules that are a priority of the agency head”); (3) “Substantive, Non-significant” “a rulemaking that 
has substantive impacts but is neither Significant, nor Routine and Frequent, nor Information-
al/Administrative/Other”); (4) “Routine and Frequent” “a specific case of a multiple recurring application of 
a regulatory program in the Code of Federal Regulations and that does not alter the body of the regulation”; 
or (5) “Informational/Administrative/Other” “[a] rulemaking that is primarily informational . . . but that the 
agency places in the Unified Agenda to inform the public of the activity”). REGULATORY INFO. SERV. 
CTR., INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL REGULATORY AND DEREGULATORY 
ACTIONS (2011), available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201110/Preamble_8888.html. 
76 Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, How to Use the Unified Agenda, available at 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_HowTo.jsp 
77 See id, at 25-26. 
78 Id. See also Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. 
L. REV. 1131, 1179 (2012) (observing that while “[t]his planning process affords OIRA several opportuni-
ties to identify regulations that might implicate the jurisdiction or interests of other agencies, and to inter-
vene to help ensure that such actions are consistent and coordinated . . . [i]t is not clear, however, whether in 
practice OIRA spends significant resources on such tasks”); Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty: Reflections and 
Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 111 (2011) (as a former OIRA administrator, opining that the 
regulatory agenda “process itself has become more of a paper exercise than an analytical tool”). 
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Notably, neither the congressional enactments nor executive orders create 
legally enforceable rights. The original RFA explicitly precluded judicial re-
view,79 while later amendments subject some sections to judicial review but 
still exclude the provisions pertaining to regulatory agenda requirements.80 The 
current statutory regime is clear that agencies are not precluded from “acting on 
any matter not included” in their agenda, nor are agencies required to consider 
any listed matters.81 The Reagan and Clinton executive orders similarly explic-
itly preclude the creation of any legally enforceable rights.82 Courts will thus 
not set aside an agency rule for failing to appear in the Unified Agenda.83 This 
observation is important as it grants a substantial degree of freedom into agen-
cies’ decisions over whether to report their activity to the Unified Agenda. Do-
ing so does not commit agencies to issue the listed rule; more importantly for 
our purposes, an agency’s failure to report a planned rule to the Agenda does 
not jeopardize the legal status of the eventual rule. 
 
II.  STRATEGIC DISCLOSURE 
Given the discretion agencies possess to disclose a contemplated rule, this 
Part examines what incentives agencies face to disclose during the pre-proposal 
period. These motivations, in turn, generate hypotheses that we test against a 
novel dataset drawn from the Federal Register. 
A.  Deciding to Disclose 
Once an agency has determined its regulatory agenda, it faces a tradeoff 
when deciding whether to disclose that agenda. On the one hand, disclosure al-
lows agencies to avoid potential reprisals from political overseers for failing to 
comply with reporting requirements; these rebukes include not only legislative 
                                                          
79 5 U.S.C. § 611 (Supp. IV 1980) (”Except as otherwise provided in [an inapplicable subsection], any de-
termination by an agency concerning the applicability of any of the provisions of this chapter to any action of 
the agency shall not be subject to judicial review.”) See Paul Verkuil, A Critical Guide to RFA, 1982 DUKE 
L.J. 213, 259-62 (1982) (describing the legislative history of the RFA and implications for judicial review). 
80 See id.. More specifically, the1996 Amendments made certain provisions of the RFA subject to judicial 
review, but excluded the relevant regulatory agenda provisions at 5 U.S.C. § 602 (2000). See Small Business 
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, Pub. L. 104-121 (1996), § 242, codified at 5 U.S.C. § 611 (2000). 
81 5 U.S.C. §602(d). 
82 Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) 
83 One possible path might be to appeal to common law reliance interests. See Groseclose, supra note 26, at 
527. However, there are no cases suggesting such a remedy, id., and we see dim prospects for the success of 
any such challenge. 
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hearings, but also potentially novel and onerous judicially enforceable proce-
dures, along the lines Congress routinely threatens to impose on agencies.84 So 
the agency must pick and choose which rules to report and which not to report. 
An agency will therefore use its “budget” for non-compliance on the rules most 
likely to benefit the agency. One of these benefits is that agencies can use dis-
closure to appease interest groups with promises — both credible and hollow 
— of future reforms. After a number of high-profile shooting deaths, for exam-
ple, the Department of Justice announced in the Unified Agenda its plans to is-
sue a rule that would bar more groups from owning guns — a move celebrated 
by gun control advocates.85 
On the other hand, disclosure is also costly to the agency. It can invite 
greater opposition, as evidenced by the National Rifle Association’s heated re-
action to the DOJ disclosure.86 Opposition can come not only from interest 
groups, but also the agency’s political overseers with divergent preferences. In-
deed, agency goals may depart from those of the President or Congress for nu-
merous reasons. Administrators and civil servants may be captured by narrow 
interest groups, thus resulting in mutually beneficial special favors.87 More re-
cent work also identifies regulators’ incentives to signal valuable human capital 
or else expand the market for their post-government services.88 For any of these 
reasons, agencies may seek regulatory (or deregulatory) policies that are at odds 
with congressional or executive desires. 
As a result, agencies confront the risk of having their policy decisions op-
posed by Congress, while executive agencies face this risk with respect to the 
                                                          
84 See infra Part III.  
85 See, e.g., Dave Boyer, Obama Intent to Toughen Gun Laws, With or Without Congress’ Help, WASH. 
TIMES (June 21, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/jun/21/after-south-carolina-obama-
intent-on-gun-restricti/?page=all (citing the DOJ’s “disclosure . . . in the administration’s Unified Agenda, a 
semiannual publication of proposed rules that the government intends to implement”), ; Matt Vespa, Good 
News: DOJ Says New Gun Regulations Are Coming In November, TOWNHALL (May 31, 2015), 
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2015/05/31/good-news-doj-says-new-gun-regulations-are-coming-in-
november-n2006276.  
86 Obama's "Unified Agenda" of Regulatory Objectives Causes Fear, Confusion,  Nat’l Rifle Ass’n Ins. for 
Legis. Action (June 5, 2015),  https://www.nraila.org/articles/20150605/obamas-unified-agenda-of-
regulatory-objectives-causes-fear-confusion. 
87 See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: 
Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. Econ. & Org. (Special Issue) 167, 169 (1990) (discussing the “special interest . . . 
theory of regulatory behavior, which describes actors in the regulatory process as having narrow, self-
interested goals—principally job retention or the pursuit of reelection, self-gratification from the exercise of 
power, or perhaps postofficeholding personal wealth”).  
88 For a summary of this literature, see Wentong Zheng, The Revolving Door, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1265, 1267-69 (2015). 
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President as well. Congress, for its part, can always override a rule by amend-
ing the authorizing statute. Similarly, it can also veto the rule through the Con-
gressional Review Act, which like a statutory amendment, would also require 
presidential assent.89 Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, Congress could 
intervene through a variety of less costly tools: for example, refusing to grant 
an agency any funds to enforce the rule, or subjecting the agency head to bruis-
ing oversight hearings.90 The President, for his part, also has multiple tools of 
agency influence. He could, for example, attempt to exercise directive authority 
over his appointed agency head, or more likely, assert supervisory power 
through a review process coordinated by OIRA.91 By presidential order, execu-
tive agencies must submit to OIRA “significant” regulatory actions for review, 
defined as those “likely to result in a rule” that meets at least one of several cri-
teria, such as having “an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or 
more,” or raising “novel legal or policy issues.”92 During this review, OIRA 
could negotiate revisions to the rule, send the regulation back to the agency 
through a return letter or else encourage a withdrawal.93 For particularly recalci-
trant agency heads, the President could threaten removal as well. 
Any of these outcomes is costly to the agency. Such interventions 
can upset months or years of work formulating the regulatory proposal.94 The 
effort required to engage with legislative or White House staff is expensive as 
well. Because administrative agencies invest considerable resources in formu-
lating their proposed rules, they have an interest in preserving their major poli-
                                                          
89 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006). That Act, among other things, requires agencies to send a copy of every 
new final rule and its associated analysis to Congress and the Government Accountability Office. Id. at § 
801(a)(1)(A) & (B). Within a sixty day review period, Congress can use expedited procedures to pass a joint 
resolution of disapproval overturning the rule. Id. at § 801(a)(3)(B). To date, however, the statute has been 
used only once in over a decade to invalidate a rule. That rule was the Occupational Safety and Health Ad-
ministration’s ergonomics standard in March 2001, “an action that some believe to be unique to the circum-
stances of its passage.” MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW 
OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A 
DECADE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT OF CONGRESS 6 (2008). At the same time, however, Congress 
has passed joint resolutions of disapproval in recent years, setting up visible vetoes by the President. See, e.g., 
Gregory Korte, Obama Vetoes Attempt to Kill Clean Water Rule, USA Today (Jan. 19, 2015), 
http://usat.ly/1V73Q55. 
90 See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 San Diego L. Rev. 61, 84–90 (2006). See id. at 
124–127.    
91 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2277-78 (2001). 
92 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641-42 (1994). For a discussion of how OIRA treats this de-
termination, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1850-54 (2012). 
93 Sunstein, supra note 87, at 1846–47. 
94 See West, supra note 1, at 416. 
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cy decisions in the final rule. They will thus undertake strategies designed to 
preserve this bureaucratic autonomy by minimizing the probability of having 
their proposed rules watered down or effectively reversed. 
One of these strategies involves the agency’s decision whether or not to 
disclose a rule on its regulatory agenda. Our initial objective below is to deter-
mine the extent to which agencies fail to disclose their rulemaking efforts be-
fore they formally propose the rule. Such failures deprive the public of the op-
portunity to get involved in the formulation of the notice of proposed 
rulemaking, which contains policy choices that are difficult to later reverse 
without a complete withdrawal. Once the rule has been proposed, however, the 
public now has notice that the agency is engaged in a rulemaking effort. At the 
same time, many rules issue without prior notice — for example, rules promul-
gated pursuant to the APA’s “good cause” or other exceptions. Disclosure of 
these rules would be valuable to explore, as we hope to in future work,95 but for 
now, empirical evidence seems to suggest that most of such actions “involve 
administrative or technical issues with limited applicability.”96 
If it turns out that the magnitude of pre proposal UA omissions is substan-
tial, then a separate question arises as to what explains this observation. The 
hypothesis frequently advanced is that such behavior is strategic in nature — 
that is, manipulated by agencies seeking to avoid the potential costs of having 
their rules challenged by overseers. Agencies that reveal their contemplated 
regulatory actions increase the probability that political monitors with divergent 
views will attempt to revise or otherwise block their rules. Disclosing a rule 
lowers their monitoring costs, thus making it easier for those with adverse in-
terests to intervene in the agency’s proposed rulemaking. A central hypothesis 
thus emerges: the more an agency expects to have different preferences from its 
monitors, the more likely the agency is to hide the regulation. 
 
B.  Testing Disclosure 
To examine this main hypothesis, this study relies on a novel dataset con-
taining over thirty years of proposed rules (1983-2014) published in the Federal 
                                                          
95 5 U.S.C. § 553(a)(b)(3)(B) (2012). 
96U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-126, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: AGENCIES OFTEN 
PUBLISHED FINAL ACTIONS WITHOUT PROPOSED RULES 2 (1998), 
HTTP://WWW.GAO.GOV/ASSETS/230/226214.PDF.,for those final rules that are more consequential, it would be 
valuable to also analyze the relevant dynamics for final rules, which we hope to address in future work. 
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Register.97 Agencies are legally required to publish their proposed rules in the 
Federal Register, unless providing actual or personal service on potentially af-
fected parties.98 These data are thus the most complete look possible at the uni-
verse of proposed rulemakings. These data also yield a number of background 
variables when available: the Federal Register citation, docket number, Regula-
tion Identifier Number (RIN), date of publication, the name of the agency re-
sponsible for the regulation,99 the length of the proposed rule (including the 
preamble), as well as any cites to the Code of Federal Regulations or the United 
States Code. 
Earlier efforts to study agency activity, by contrast, have relied almost ex-
clusively on Unified Agenda entries to capture rulemaking behavior.100 Howev-
er, most users have acknowledged — and various studies (including this one) 
confirm101 — that these data are incomplete.102 Because agenda entries are self-
reported, they are susceptible to human error. Agencies and administrations 
may also omit data for the strategic reasons we suggest. This incompleteness 
raises questions about the validity of earlier empirical research relying on the 
Unified Agenda,103 but also presents new research opportunities. The fact that 
agencies likely self-report imperfectly to the Unified Agenda allows an exami-
nation of the conditions under which an agency opts to expose its regulatory ac-
tions to public view, and whether such behavior is strategic or benign. 
As an initial overview, the Federal Register data suggest that administra-
tive agencies published a total of 65,833 proposed rules over this 30 year peri-
                                                          
97 This window of analysis corresponds to another dataset created with regard to the Unified Agenda, which 
also begins in 1983. 
98 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2012)(“General notice of proposed rule making shall be published in the Federal Regis-
ter, unless persons subject thereto are named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice 
thereof in accordance with law.”). 
99 As explained below, this is a more challenging task than it sounds, and we cannot recover the name of the 
responsible agency for all rules.  
100 See sources cited supra note 39. 
101 See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
102 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, 
Games, and Accountability, 57 L.& CONTEMP. PROBS., 185, 198 n.41 (1994) (noting that his investigation 
into the quality of the Unified Agenda data was “sufficiently disappointing that [he did] not pursue[] the anal-
ysis on a more ‘scientific’ basis”); O’Connell, Political Cycles, supra note 38, at 927 n.108 (noting that the 
“Unified Agenda data are not perfect; they need confirmatory research.”). 
103 In fact, only about 31 percent of NPRMs in our dataset appear in the Unified Agenda at any stage of the 
rulemaking process — including completed action reports — before or after the NPRM appears in the Federal 
Register. 
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od.104 Although it was not always possible to match these proposed rules with 
the identity of the issuing agency, the remaining 86 percent of proposed rules 
indicate that a disproportionately select number of agencies issue rulemaking 
proposals. Specifically, the Department of Transportation (DOT) is the most 
prolific agency by a considerable margin — issuing over 20 percent of all pro-
posed rules in the series. Four other agencies issued over 3,000 proposals over 
the relevant period: the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with just over 
9,000 proposed rules; the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) with 
just over 6,000 proposed rules); and the Departments of Interior and Agricul-
ture with roughly 3,000 and 4,000 proposed rules, respectively. Combined, 
these five agencies produced a remarkable 58 percent of all proposed rules. 
 
1.  Agenda Underreporting 
The first descriptive question that arises is the extent to which agencies 
self-report their anticipated proposed rules to the Unified Agenda. A resulting 
methodological challenge is to construct a measure of agency disclosure. Be-
cause the focus here is on the pre-proposal period, the relevant outcome of in-
terest is the extent to which agencies include their pre-proposal regulatory ac-
tivities on the Agenda—that is, how often do agencies inform the public of 
notices of proposed rulemaking that they later issue? 
To investigate this question, we obtained machine-readable versions of the 
Agenda from the General Services Administration.105 We then determined 
which of the entries in the Agenda relate to rulemaking efforts that both pro-
duced a proposed rule published in the Federal Register and appeared in the 
Agenda beforehand.106 This task required the development of a database of pro-
                                                          
104 As explained in the Appendix, we sought to cull from the dataset a variety of Federal Register notices 
that announce something other than a rulemaking; for instance, notices of public hearings, notices of peti-
tions, notices of inquiry, and so on. The appendix details our extensive efforts in this regard, including our 
attempts to validate our data.  
105 These data consist of potentially several entries for a single rule, as identified by the Regulation Identifier 
Number (RIN). For example, the same rule might have a UA entry at the time it is proposed, the time it is 
finalized, and then again another entry as a “completed action” following finalization. See the appendix for 
details on data processing. 
106 Specifically, we first develop a comprehensive Agenda dataset that retains the last entry available for 
each RIN; this will often, but not always, be at the “completed action” stage of the rulemaking process. These 
last-in entries supply the dates, rule abstracts, Federal Register citations, and the like that we use in the analy-
sis below. Then, for each RIN in this Agenda dataset, we determine and record the earliest stage at which it 
appeared in the Unified Agenda (pre proposal, proposal, and so on). This latter variable informs us of whether 
the rule appeared on the Agenda at the proposal stage or earlier. 
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posed rules from the Federal Register, another dataset of Unified Agenda en-
tries, and a method of relating entries between the sources. Appendix B de-
scribes these steps in more detail. These efforts, in turn, allowed for the identi-
fication of proposed rules for which the Agenda put the public on early notice. 
The data reveal some stark figures. As an initial matter, between 1983 and 
2014, the Unified Agenda reports contained a total of at most 18,303 entries 
during the pre-proposal stage that eventually resulted in a proposed rule in our 
data.107 By comparison, as noted above, there were about 65,833 proposed rules 
published in the Federal Register. Simply placing these figures side-by-side re-
veals that agencies dramatically under-report their activity in the Agenda. In 
particular, agencies appear to report about 28 percent of their proposed rules to 
the Unified Agenda before they appear in the Federal Register.108 Put different-
                                                          
107 We arrive at this estimate in the following way. First, the Agenda reports a total of 26,806 proposed rules 
over the series. However, we only find matches for 19,848 of these entries in the Federal Register. That 
leaves 6,958 “orphan” entries, that is, entries that are reported by agencies as proposed rules but that lack a 
match in an actual published proposed rule. These entries may be “orphans” for one of two reasons: (1) agen-
cies placed these entries on the Agenda as proposed rules, but they were never actually proposed, whether due 
to change in priorities or because they never intended to propose them in the first place; (2) alternatively, our 
mapping method, detailed in Appendix B, may be too inaccurate to match the agenda entries to actual pro-
posed rule published in the Final Register, despite their existence. Under these circumstances, we proceed 
conservatively by assuming that all of the “orphan” Agenda entries, almost 7,000 of them, in fact eventually 
became proposed rules, and that our mapping method simply could not detect them.  
 
Our next task is to identify how many of the rules reported by agencies as proposed rules were published in 
the Agenda before promulgated in the Federal Register. The issue here is that agencies often self-report a rule 
as a proposed rule after publication has already occurred. By comparing the relevant dates, as detailed in Ap-
pendix A, we find that only 11,345 of non-orphan entries in the Agenda entry preceded the date the proposed 
rule appeared in the Federal Register. We cannot determine whether the 6,958 “orphan” entries were dis-
closed before publication given that there is no matching Federal Register entry. Therefore, once again, we 
proceed conservatively by assuming that all of them were indeed published in the Agenda before Federal 
Register publication.   
 
These calculations result in a fairly generous estimate of 18,303 Agenda entries that were disclosed before 
Federal Register publication (11,345 known disclosed entries + 6,958 orphaned entries). This estimate is gen-
erous in the sense that the conservative assumptions regarding the orphaned entries are very strong. In reality, 
many of these “orphaned” entries likely did not lead to an eventual proposed rule, or if they did, were likely 
not reported to the Unified Agenda before the associated rule was proposed. See infra Appendix B. 
108 The numerator reflects the number of Unified Agenda entries that we were able to match to our popula-
tion of proposed rules that had an Agenda publication date prior to the NPRM date. This measure could over-
state the degree of under-reporting in a few ways. If the agency fails to record a citation in the Agenda entry 
for the NPRM, or does so incorrectly, our data would not be able to match the Agenda entry to a proposed 
rule in the Federal Register (see Appendix A for further details). In addition, if agencies issue multiple 
NPRMs, this may lead to an overstated rate of under-reporting since only one NPRM is matched to each UA 
rulemaking entry. However, this issue is mitigated by the Agenda’s observation that, based on our calcula-
tions, only 1.3 percent of rulemaking efforts with at least one NPRM feature more than one NPRM. As one 
bound on the combined sources of error, even if one relies solely on the Agenda’s self-reported characteriza-
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ly, about 72 percent of proposed rules — on the order of 50,000 since 1983 — 
have been sprung on the public for the first time in the Federal Register. Many 
of these rules were likely promulgated after considerable periods of develop-
ment and consultation with regulatory insiders. 
While the sheer magnitude of nondisclosure may be disconcerting, one 
might nevertheless wonder about the nature of the undisclosed proposed rules. 
If the vast majority are simply informational, ministerial, or otherwise routine 
in nature, their absence on the Unified Agenda may not be worrisome. Indeed, 
many of the proposed rules in our main dataset are arguably minor including, 
for example, airworthiness directives from the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). Airworthiness directives are legally enforceable regulations issued by 
the FAA to correct an unsafe condition in a product and thus have limited 
scope.109 Based on the titles of the proposed rules, roughly 9,000 of the 65,000 
proposed rules in the dataset — some fourteen percent of the total — are air-
worthiness directives. 
On the other hand, if some of the missing rules are politically salient or 
otherwise have substantial effect, then strategic non-disclosure is more prob-
lematic. It is clear that at least some of the non-disclosed rules fall into these 
categories of concern. Consider, for example, a proposed rule on country-of-
origin-labeling-for-meat-cuts, estimated to impact over 7,000 firms and count-
less consumers.110 Country-of-origin labeling has been a contentious issue for 
years, with supporters arguing that it enables consumer choice, and detractors 
claiming that the labels are costly and misleading barriers to trade. Thus, one 
would expect the public to be interested in relevant regulatory developments. 
The Department of Agriculture (USDA), however, did not disclose that it was 
working on a new proposal before its promulgation.111 The agency issued the 
proposed rule after an adverse World Trade Organization (WTO) ruling and the 
new regulation required labels to “specify the production steps of birth, raising, 
                                                                                                                                             
tions of rulemaking stage rather than the dates of publications—we find only about 18,000 pre-notice NPRMs 
listed in the Agenda, implying a reporting rate of roughly 30 percent. The true reporting rate is likely some-
where between these two figures. See id. 
109 See Federal Aviation Administration, Regulations and Policies: Airworthiness Directives (ADs), (June 
22, 2015), https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/airworthiness_directives/. 
110 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised 
Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts 78 
Fed. Reg. 15645, 15,645-15,652 (Mar. 12, 2013). 
111 Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, 
Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Perishable Agricultural commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Macadamia Nuts, Gin-
seng, etc., http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaSimpleSearch, by searching RIN “0581-AD29”. 
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and slaughter of the animal from which the meat is derivd” in each country-of-
origin.112 It also revised coverage definitions and prohibited the commingling of 
certain commodities of different origins.113 Importantly, when USDA issued the 
final rule, the agency did not materially alter any of these provisions,114 thereby 
illustrating the importance of the policy choices made at the proposed rule 
stage.  
At the same time, many other examples of non-disclosed food labeling 
regulations abound — pertaining to claims regarding coronary heart disease,115 
gluten-free statements,116 and “healthy” sodium level assertions.117 Beyond la-
beling regulations is a diverse set of other missing proposed rules likely to be of 
public interest. They include, for example, critical habitat and threatened spe-
cies determinations,118 Affordable Care Act regulations relating to small-
businesses and health care exchanges,119 and even the EPA’s high-profile 
greenhouse gas endangerment finding.120 None of these proposed rules were 
disclosed on the Unified Agenda before their promulgation. 
A more systematic approach to understanding the character of rules miss-
ing from the Agenda involves taking a random sample from the larger dataset 
                                                          
112 Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-Raised 
Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia Nuts, 78 
Fed. Reg. at 15,645. 
113 Id at 15, 645-46. 
114 See Mandatory Country of Origin Labeling of Beef, Pork, Lamb, Chicken, Goat Meat, Wild and Farm-
Raised Fish and Shellfish, Perishable Agricultural Commodities, Peanuts, Pecans, Ginseng, and Macadamia 
Nuts, 78 Fed. Reg. 31,367 (May 24, 2013).   
115 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE: FOOD LABELING: HEALTH CLAIMS; SOLUBLE FIBER FROM 
CERTAIN FOODS AND RISK OF CORONARY HEART DISEASE, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2007-02-
06/E7-1849. 
116 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE: FOOD LABELING; GLUTEN-FREE LABELING OF FOODS; 
REOPENING OF THE COMMENT PERIOD, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granule/FR-2011-08-03/2011-19620. 
117 Food Labeling; Nutrient Content Claims, Definition of Sodium Levels for the Term "Healthy" (RIN: 
0910-AC49).  
118 See, e.g., Designation of Critical Habitat for the Beringia Distinct Population Segment of the Bearded 
Seal (RIN: 0648-BC55); Designation of Critical Habitat for the Arctic Ringed Seal (RIN: 0648-
BC56);Listing Gouania Hillebrandii As an Endangered Plant and Determining Its Critical Habitat (RIN: 
1018-YB20); Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, Proposed Endangered Status and Critical Hab-
itat for the Amargosa Vole (RIN: 1018-YB32); Determine Eriogonum Pelinophilum to Be an Endangered 
Species and to Designate Its Critical Habitat (RIN: 1018-YB74). 
119 See, e.g., Establishment of Exchanges and Qualified Health Plans; Small Business Health Options Pro-
gram (SHOP) (RIN: 0938-AR76); 3206-AN12; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Establishment of 
the Multi-State Plan Program for the Affordable Insurance Exchanges; (RIN: 0938-AS32Annual Eligibility 
Determinations for Exchange Participation and Insurance Affordability Programs; Health Insurance Issuer 
Standards Under the Affordable Care Act (RIN: CMS-9941-P). 
120 See Proposed Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases Under Section 
202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66,496 (Apr. 24, 2009) (RIN: 2060-ZA14). 
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and manually inspecting this random sample. Standard sampling theory sug-
gests that this exercise is informative. Just as taking a poll of likely voters helps 
gauge the thinking of the electorate, so too can sampling observations from our 
dataset help us understand what it contains. This analysis can also help to moti-
vate further inquiries. We randomly select 200 rules from our dataset in the 
post-1994 part of the series, after Executive Order 12,866 was issued; the focus 
is therefore on the period for which the “significance” determination exists.121 
We then read the 200 proposed rules to arrive at a sense of what they contain, 
inspecting also whether they appear in the Unified Agenda. 
 Most of the proposed rules — 113 of the 200 — come from the FAA, 
the EPA, or the FCC. Many of these proposed rules have an adjudicatory feel-
ing to them, along the lines of the FAA’s airworthiness directives. Technically, 
these agency actions are rulemakings, but they are of limited scope and ap-
plicability. Corroborating this assessment, one informative metric is that the av-
erage length of proposed rules from these three agencies in our sample is 3,800 
words. By comparison, the average length of proposed rules from other agen-
cies is about 8,000 words. Very few of the proposed rules from these three 
agencies, only about 10 out of 113, appear in the Agenda. 
Many OIRA-reviewed “significant” rules do not make it into the Agenda 
as well. Significant rules, recall, are defined by executive order as those regula-
tory actions “likely to result in a rule” that meets at least one of several criteria, 
most notably raising “novel legal or policy issues” or having “an annual effect 
on the economy of $100 million or more.”122 This latter subset of rules is com-
monly characterized as “economically significant.”123 Economically signifi-
cant and significant rules are therefore those regulations that are of most inter-
est to elected officials like the President or legislators. They are among the most 
publicly salient. Of the 165 proposed rules promulgated by executive agencies 
in this sample, we identify 13 significant rules. Less than half — 6 of 13 — ap-
                                                          
121 President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 on September 30, 1993. See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 
3(f), 3 C.F.R. at 641-42.   
122 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641-42 (1993). For a discussion of how OIRA treats this 
determination, see Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs: Myths and Realities, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1850-54 (2013). 
123See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 (1993). Circular A-4, in turn, states that 
“Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically significant reg-
ulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).” See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Circular A-4, To The Heads 
of Executive Agencies and Establishments, Regulatory Analysis (2003) (hereinafter Circular A-4), availa-
ble at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4. 
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pear in the Unified Agenda prior to publication.124 That said, note that the 
standard error on this estimated reporting rate is large for this subset of signifi-
cant rules: roughly 14 percentage points. Nevertheless, the broader point here is 
that a non-trivial proportion of even significant proposed rules likely do not ap-
pear in the Agenda prior to publication in the Federal Register.   
A broader examination of significant rules — now using a more compre-
hensive but unfortunately still-imperfect dataset of OIRA-revised significant 
rules — further confirms that likely-noteworthy regulations are missing from 
timely agenda reporting.125 Figure 1 reports the proportion of proposed eco-
nomically significant and significant rules that appeared in the Unified Agenda 
before publication. The data shown in the figure’s left panel reveal that, on av-
erage, only about 70 percent of significant proposed rules appear in the Unified 
Agenda at the proposed rule stage or earlier. In other words, about 30 percent of 
the significant rules proposed in our time period were not disclosed before pub-
lication. This exercise largely corroborates the findings in other studies, which 
indicate that a substantial portion of significant proposed rules appear in the 
Unified Agenda.126 Focusing on the economically significant rules — that is, 
those rules with estimated annual economic impact of $100 million or greater 
— one sees roughly the same pattern, as shown in the right panel of Figure 1. 
The reporting rate for these rules is now slightly higher at about 75 percent.  
 
                                                          
124 Some proposed rules appear in the Agenda, but after they first appeared in the Federal Register. A total of 
9 out of 13 appear in the Agenda at some point in the lifecycle of the rule. 
125 In order to identify the complete set of significant rules, we initially attempted to isolate and analyze text 
around mentions of “12,866” in the proposed rules’ preambles, but were only able to recover about 50 signif-
icant proposed rules per year. This figure is roughly a quarter of the amount one would expect based on 
counts provided by the Regulatory Information Service Center. See 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearchInit?action=init. As a result, we instead turned to a separate 
dataset of significant rules reviewed by OIRA. In relying on the OIRA review data for the population of sig-
nificant rules, this analysis adopts the same approach as Curtis Copeland. See COPELAND, supra note 8 at 17-
19. This approach unfortunately has two main drawbacks. First, agencies do not always promulgate draft pro-
posed rules reviewed by OIRA. Second, when determining whether the proposed rule appeared in the Agenda 
prior to the Federal Register, we must rely on how agencies report the “stage” of the rulemaking process in 
the Agenda —  rather than comparing the date that the proposed rule appeared in the Federal Register and the 
date that the rule first appeared in the Agenda. Many of these self-reported stages, however, are likely errone-
ous. 
126 Curtis Copeland’s study for the Congressional Research Service, for example, finds that roughly 75 per-
cent of the 231 significant proposed rules published in 2008 had a previous Agenda entry. See COPELAND, 
supra note 11, at 9.  In a subsequent study for the Administrative Conference of the United States, Copeland 
finds that, for 88 significant proposed rules published by executive agencies in the first half of 2014, about 94 
percent were previously disclosed in the Unified Agenda. See id. at 38. 
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FIGURE 1.  Reporting of Significant Rules 
 
 
 
Taking a step back, it should be unsurprising that agencies report more 
significant rules at higher rates given that political principals are likely to be-
come aware of these rules through other channels, such as fire-alarm oversight 
by regulatory insiders.127 So the gains from shielding the development of such 
regulations are likely minimal, at least as compared to the political costs of 
agenda non-compliance. At the same time, the fact that agencies’ fail to report 
at least a quarter of their most significant regulations is troubling. While it is 
possible that some of these missing rules can be explained by agencies that may 
issue multiple proposed rules for a single agenda entry, this dynamic would still 
dilute the initial notice’s specificity and effectiveness. Selective disclosure may 
also enable agencies to distract monitors from particular rules. Even those hid-
den rules that are not OIRA-significant may also be precisely the type where 
capture and other forms of regulatory misfeasance are most likely. While these 
rules have a decent chance of sliding through the system undetected by oppo-
nents, they may work substantial favors to narrow, special interests. Airworthi-
ness directives, for example, can still be the subject of public controversy and 
affect thousands of registered airplanes and their owners.128 Thus, it is im-
portant that less connected and well-resourced stakeholders—small businesses 
and public interest groups—have information about such regulatory develop-
ments through the Unified Agenda or similar means. 
To this end, it will now be useful to getter a better sense of where and in 
which agencies these dynamics may be the most prevalent. Consulting the main 
dataset once again,129 Figure 2 shows that reporting rates differ widely among 
the agencies. The figure depicts the proportion of proposed rules that each 
agency reports to the Unified Agenda: on the x-axis is the proportion of all 
                                                          
127 McNollgast¸supra note 33, at 250. 
128 See, e.g., Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association, Regulatory Brief  --  FAA Replaces Controversial AD 
Proposal, Allows Alternative Wing Spar Inspection for Aeronca/Bellanca/Champion Airplanes, 
http://www.aopa.org/Advocacy/Regulatory-,-a-,-Certification-Policy/Regulatory-Brief-FAA-replaces-
controversial-AD-proposal-allows-alternative-wing-spar-inspection-for-Aeronca-Bellanca-Champion (noting 
that the “proposed [airworthiness directive] would affect approximately 6,500 U.S. registered airplanes”). 
129 See Appendix B for a description of how we construct the main dataset. 
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rules that are reported, and on the y-axis are the agencies. The figure shows that 
the proportion of rules that appear in the Agenda prior to finalization ranges 
from under 10 percent at approximately ten agencies — including the FCC and 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) — to over 70 percent at two agen-
cies—the Railroad Retirement Board (RRB) and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD).  
It is not immediately clear what explains this enormous variation in report-
ing behavior among agencies, but some fine-grained accounts are plausible. In-
dependent agencies appear somewhat less assiduous in their reporting behavior; 
on average, their reporting rate is about 5 percentage points lower. This finding 
may be due to the fact that OIRA’s review of their agenda entries is likely to be 
even more deferential than for executive agencies. Situated in the Executive Of-
fice of the President, OIRA also possesses less information about their regulato-
ry activities. The office is thus ill-equipped to serve as a check on Agenda 
completeness. Other differences between agencies likely reflect some combina-
tion of agency culture as well as difficult-to-quantify heterogeneity in the con-
tent of rules. For this reason, agency-fixed effects are included in some of the 
specifications below. 
 
FIGURE 2.  Reporting Rates by Agency130 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
130 See Appendix C for a key mapping agency abbreviations to their full names.  
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2.  Divided Government 
While agencies substantially under-report their rulemaking activity to the 
Unified Agenda, this section now asks whether this behavior reflects a strategic 
choice by agencies to evade political oversight. The under-reporting, after all, 
might simply reflect benign considerations. Unexpected events such as mine 
explosions or acts of financial malfeasance may suddenly increase the public’s 
demand for regulatory action, thus resulting in last-minute, expedited rule-
makings not previously placed on the Agenda. Such unexpected events may al-
so divert internal resources that, in turn, prevent the timely preparation of agen-
da items. Alternatively, poor management and intra-agency coordination 
failures may also contribute to what amounts to incompetent, but non-strategic 
omission of entries. Furthermore, interviews with agency officials suggest that 
the semi-annual nature of the Unified Agenda may prevent officials from 
providing accurate and updated information.131 In light of these potential expla-
nations — strategic and benign — the answer cannot be determined solely from 
theory, but must be empirically uncovered. 
Recall that Congress possesses many tools with which it can attempt to re-
verse or otherwise influence the agency’s rule.132 When a legislative majority 
has different preferences than that of the agency, it can require the agency to 
engage in expensive oversight hearings, threaten or impose budget cuts, and 
even curtail the agency’s authority. It may also eventually attempt to overturn 
the regulation through the Congressional Review Act, which if successful, will 
                                                          
131 COPELAND, supra note 8, 95-98. 
132 See Beermann, supra note 90 and accompanying text 
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similarly impose costs and thwart the agency’s preferences. Strategic agencies 
will be less likely to disclose their regulatory activities under these circum-
stances. By hiding their regulatory activity, agencies can shorten the amount of 
time that interest groups and monitors have to learn about and engage with the 
proposed rule before it is finalized.133 
One straightforward method for testing this hypothesis is to examine agen-
cy reporting behavior during periods of unified and divided government — that 
is, when at least one house of Congress and the President are from different po-
litical parties. Because agencies are generally part of the executive branch and 
because their leaders and chairmen are appointed by the President, agencies are 
more likely to align with the party of the President.134 Thus, when at least one 
house of Congress is controlled by an opposing political party, it is more likely 
to be hostile to the preferences of the administrative agency. Under these cir-
cumstances, strategic agencies will be less likely to disclose their regulatory ac-
tivities. 
The analysis indeed finds that the probability that a proposed rule appears 
in the Unified Agenda decreases by roughly 4 percentage points during periods 
of divided government, as reported in the first column of the top panel of Table 
1 below. In other words, when the President and Congress are from different 
political parties, an agency’s reporting rate drops by about 4 percent. This result 
is statistically significant at any conventional level. Although the magnitude of 
the decline may sound small, recall that, on average, agencies appear to report 
only about 28 percent of their NPRMs to the Unified Agenda. 
 
TABLE 1.  Unified Agenda Reporting: Independent and Executive Agencies 
 
All Proposed Rules 
 
All Agen-
cies 
Executive 
Agencies 
Independent 
Agencies 
Divided Government -0.04** -0.04** -0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
                                                          
133 McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 33, at 434-44; Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1163 
(noting that strategic agency behavior “can allow the monitored to choose the monitors”). 
134 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and the Limits of 
Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 460-61 (2008) (finding empirical evidence of notable presidential 
control over even independent agencies due to increased ideological partisanship). 
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Agency-President Discord -0.01 -0.01 0 
 
(0) (0) (0.02) 
Election Year 0 0.01 0 
 
(0) (0) (0.01) 
Time Trend Y Y Y 
Time Trend (squared) Y Y Y 
Agency Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 56207 47267 8580 
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.11 
 
Longer Proposed Rules 
 
All Agen-
cies 
Executive 
Agencies 
Independent 
Agencies 
Divided Government -0.07** -0.08** -0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
Agency-President Discord -0.01 0 -0.02 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) 
Election Year 0.01 0.01 0 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Time Trend Y Y Y 
Time Trend (squared) Y Y Y 
Agency Fixed Effects Y Y Y 
N 13765 11877 1888 
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.08 
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Note: ** denotes p <0.01; * denotes p<0.05; ' denotes p<0.1. Standard errors are 
clustered by agency and reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is an 
indicator for whether the proposed rule appears in the Unified Agenda prior to 
finalization; other variables are  indicated by name in a straightforward way. See 
note 101 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion of agency-
president discord. Models in the top panel include all observations; models in 
the bottom panel include only proposed rules consisting of 5000 words or more. 
All models include controls for rule "complexity," i.e., an indicator for whether 
the rule refers to more than one part of the CFR, and the length of the proposed 
rule. 
 
Nevertheless, one might wonder to what extent the observed strategic be-
havior pertains to the most significant rules. It is possible, after all, that this re-
sult is mainly driven by small or ministerial rules. While previously-discussed 
data limitations unfortunately do not permit a precise answer,135 one can attempt 
to examine this question by using a rough (albeit imperfect) proxy of signifi-
cance like rule length. More specifically, take a set of non-significant rules with 
limited impact like the FAA airworthiness directives. The average number of 
words in an FAA airworthiness directive is about 2300, with a standard devia-
tion of about 1600 words.136 Thus, rules above 5000 words are unlikely to be 
FAA airworthiness directives or similarly minor rules; indeed, over 98 percent 
of airworthiness directives have fewer than 5,000 words. If one zeroes in on 
longer proposed rules of 5,000 words or more — as shown in the first column 
of Table 1’s bottom panel —  the effect of divided government on reporting 
almost doubles to roughly 7 percentage points. 
This strategic effect would be expected to be even stronger for agencies 
controlled to a greater extent by the President. Indeed, some existing evidence 
suggests that agencies under more presidential control exhibit greater sensitivi-
ty to presidential electoral cycles.137 To test this view, it is useful to now repeat 
the analyses above, but conduct them separately for independent agencies and 
                                                          
135 See note 124. 
136 That is, if we use the titles of the proposed rules to determine which ones are Airworthiness Directives, 
we find that such identified proposed rules have an average of about 2300 words. 
137 See Stiglitz, supra note 31.  
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executive agencies.138 Consider first the results relating to executive agencies, 
over which the president exerts greater control, as shown in the second column 
of Table 1: the top panel again reflects all proposed rules, while the bottom 
panel reflects longer proposed rules. Here, the reporting rate is about 4 percent-
age points lower for all rules, and about 8 percentage points lower for longer 
rules during periods of divided government. 
Moreover, as evident from the third column in Table 1, it appears that in-
dependent agency reporting rates are relatively insensitive to the conditions of 
divided government or unified government. The magnitude of the coefficient 
on divided government tends to be smaller relative to the magnitude of the cor-
responding coefficient for executive agencies; the coefficients on divided gov-
ernment are also not statistically significant at conventional levels. The results 
from Table 1 therefore suggest that much of the strategic behavior we identify 
derives from the behavior of executive agencies. In other words, the agencies 
most controlled by the President and likely to disagree with Congress during 
periods of divided government are those that exhibit the most sensitivity to 
Congress’ partisan composition. Independent agencies, by comparison, are less 
sensitive to conditions of divided government. 
As another check, it is useful to further probe this relationship by examin-
ing intervals immediately around a switch in party control of one or more hous-
es of Congress. By isolating the analysis to these discrete time periods, one can 
better control for the preferences and culture of an administration, as well as for 
other unobservable factors that vary over time, such as rule composition. Be-
cause such factors remain relatively stable within an administration, at least lo-
cally around the switch in Congress, this alternative approach allows for a rela-
tively cleaner assessment of whether reporting behavior is responsive to divided 
government. 
Our dataset contains several midterm switches to or from divided govern-
ment. However, we will only observe a sharp change in behavior if the shift in 
                                                          
138 The relative independence of an agency from presidential control rests along a continuum rather than as a 
simple binary distinction between independent agencies and executive agencies. Indicia of independence 
could include statutory removal protections, a multimember structure, partisan balance requirements, budget 
and congressional communication authority, litigation authority, as well as adjudication authority. See Kirti 
Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. 
REV. 769, 772-73 (2013). For the purposes of this Article, Appendix C specifies which agencies we classify 
as “executive” and which agencies we classify as “independent.” Essentially, we use the statutory definition 
of “independent regulatory agency” contained in the Paperwork Reduction Act to generate a list of “inde-
pendent” agencies and categorize the remaining agencies as “executive.” 44 U.S.C.SS 3502(5) (2010).  
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government comes as a surprise, because if the agencies anticipate a shift in di-
vided government, they will smoothly adapt their behavior before the shift oc-
curs. The most natural “surprise” shift in divided government to consider is the 
one following the 1994 election, in which the Republicans took control of the 
House for the first time in almost fifty years.139 A further advantage of this par-
ticular midterm shift is that the Unified Agenda appeared late, on November 14, 
1994, somewhat reducing the challenge noted immediately above. 
Each dot in Figure 3 represents the proportion of proposed rules that have 
an entry in the Unified Agenda; the size of the dot is proportional to the number 
of proposed rules issuing in that week. Thus, we run an index reflecting the 
week of the administration on the x-axis (i.e., “4” means week four of the ad-
ministration), and we plot the proportion of proposed rules reported to the Uni-
fied Agenda that were on the y-axis. The figure also contains two vertical 
dashed lines: the left line represents the week of the election, and the right line 
represents the week of the congressional transition. Although divided govern-
ment did not, as a matter of fact, begin until January of 1995, the election re-
solved any uncertainty regarding this fact several weeks earlier, and one might 
therefore expect agency behavior to shift around the election date rather than 
the date of congressional transition. The analysis thus focuses on the interval 
around the election date, plotting the trends before and after this date in solid 
grey lines.140 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
139 E.g., David W. Brady et al., The Perils of Presidential Support: How the Republicans Took the House in 
the 1994 Midterm Elections, 18 POL. BEHAV. 345, 362 (1996) (observing that “[t]he Republican takeover of 
the House of Representatives in 1994 caught most observers of elections by surprise”).Another obvious can-
didate for a surprise shift in divided government involves the 2001 switch in parties by Senator Jeffords. 
However, that switch occurred so early in the Bush adminstration—just four months in—with appointments 
still underway, that agency officials had little time to develop their own rules, suggesting many of these rules 
represent carryover efforts from the previous administration. 
140 The solid grey lines represent locally weighted averages and smooth week-to-week fluctuations to reveal 
systematic trends. 
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Immediately prior to the 1994 election, the Clinton administration agencies had 
reported roughly 30 percent of their proposed rules to a previous edition of the 
Unified Agenda. In other words, prior to November 8, about 30 percent of 
agencies’ proposed rules had been previously reported in some edition of the 
Unified Agenda up to that year’s spring edition, which was published on April 
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25th.141 By comparison, immediately after the 1994 election, the percentage of 
anticipated rules appearing in the Unified Agenda dropped by about 7 percent-
age points. Importantly, the fall edition of the Unified Agenda that year was not 
issued in October as usual, but rather on November 14th — 6 days after the 
election. Thus, the immediate shift in reporting rates that followed after the 
election was more likely due to behavioral changes with respect to the recent 
fall edition of the Unified Agenda.  
An alternative interpretation of this figure is that the change instead re-
flects the fact that agencies adapted their proposed rules to appease the new Re-
public majority. Thus, the drop in the reporting rate comes not from a lack of 
transparency but rather from an increase in the number of novel proposed rules 
now designed to satisfy different congressional overseers. These new proposed 
rules, the argument continues, could not have been reported the previous spring 
nor in the fall due to a lag in agenda preparation. In this view, agencies are act-
ing responsively, not strategically. While our data cannot definitively reject this 
theory, we believe the scenario is highly unlikely for two reasons. First, agen-
cies are generally unable to promulgate new proposed rules so quickly as to 
produce a notable effect immediately after the election. The average amount of 
time that agencies take to write and develop a rule is often over a year or so.142 
Second, as previously mentioned, the publication of the fall edition of the Uni-
fied Agenda that year was nearly contemporaneous with the election. Because 
agencies can revise agenda items until the date of publication,143 they had the 
ability to reduce the transparency of their regulatory efforts almost immediately 
following the election. Put differently, though constrained by Agenda entries 
they had submitted for previous Unified Agenda data calls, agencies could 
choose not to disclose their continuing stream of proposed rules on that year’s 
                                                          
141 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-UA-1994-04-25/html/GPO-UA-1994-04-25-1.htm 
142 One challenge is that it is difficult to observe the date at which agencies “start” a rulemaking; typically 
we observe only the date of the NPRM, but we know that agencies engage in extensive pre-notice activity. 
For an estimate of the duration between NPRM and final action, see Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rule-
making and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. 
L. REV. 471, 513 (2011) (finding that, between the fall of 1983 and the spring of 2010, the average rule-making took 462.79 days to complete, from NPRM to finalization).  
143 As Copeland reports, agencies may revise their Unified Agenda entries, potentially until shortly before 
the Agenda is published. COPELAND, supra note 8 at 25-26. 
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fall agenda.144  
 
3.  Intra-Executive Branch 
Of course, administrative agencies are subject not only to congressional, 
but also to presidential, oversight as well. Just as agencies have policy disa-
greements with Congress, so too do they with the President. As a result, it is 
reasonable to suppose that agencies would attempt to hide their contemplated 
regulatory actions from the regulatory agenda when they disagree with the sit-
ting President on policy matters.145 Such behavior might make it more difficult 
for the president to monitor agencies directly or indirectly though allied interest 
groups. 
One countervailing consideration is that the President, as discussed,146 is 
able to oversee executive agencies through many channels not available to 
Congress. Perhaps most importantly, the President has centralized the review of 
executive agency rulemaking through OIRA. He also has access to more infor-
mal means of influence and information through his presidential appointees and 
a broader White House apparatus. To the extent that these alternative devices of 
influence and information makes it fruitless for agencies to attempt to hide 
through non-disclosure on the Unified Agenda, one might expect to see rela-
tively attenuated results in the context of executive branch oversight. 
To test these competing hypotheses, it would be ideal to have a measure of 
the preference divergence between each agency and the sitting president for 
each year in our series. Unfortunately, no such measure exists.147 So our dataset 
relies on a popular, but static, measure of agency preferences developed by Pro-
                                                          
144 As a sort of “placebo” test, we also examine midterm elections that do not result in a shift in congression-
al control; here, we do not observe the same pattern of a post-election drop in reporting rate. 
145 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation Under Presidential Review, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1755, 1803-04, 
1809 (2013).  
146 See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
147 Professors Bertelli and Grose produce perhaps the closest such measures. See generally Anthony M. Ber-
telli & Christian R. Grose, The Lengthened Shadow of Another Institution? Ideal Point Estimates for the Ex-
ecutive Branch and Congress, AM. J. POL. SCI. (2011) (developing ideal point estimates for cabinet depart-
ment heads from 1991 to 2004). However, as stated, this dataset only covers the heads of cabinet 
departments, and excludes all independent agencies, such as the FCC, as well as the EPA. Moreover, it is not 
obvious that the agencies’ preferences are best represented by the preferences of their heads, as the heads 
themselves face a wide range of constraints on their behavior.  
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fessors Joshua Clinton and David Lewis.148 These scores are based on experts’ 
ratings of agency ideologies. Professors Clinton and Lewis survey a set of aca-
demics who study the bureaucracy, as well as Washington D.C.-based insiders, 
and record these individuals’ assessments of agency policy dispositions. Under 
the Clinton-Lewis scores, a negative value indicates a liberal agency, and a pos-
itive value indicates a conservative one. Our analysis takes these Clinton-Lewis 
scores, and then adjusts them according to whether the president is a Democrat 
or Republican. If the president is a Republican, the Clinton-Lewis scores are 
multiplied by negative one, such that higher values indicate more liberal agency 
preferences, and thus more likely disagreement between agency and president. 
If the president is a Democrat, the scores are left intact, such that higher values 
indicate more conservative agency preferences, and again, more likely disa-
greement between agency and president. 
Table 1 above reports the results for this exercise. There, note that — re-
gardless of which set of rules or agencies we consider — the coefficient on this 
measure for agency-president discord is essentially zero. This is true whether or 
not agency fixed effects are included. These findings suggest that there is little 
relationship between expected preference divergence and agency reporting be-
havior. Greater agency-president disagreement, it seems, is not associated with 
any change in agency disclosure. One plausible explanation for this pattern is 
that agencies face few incentives to hide their agendas from the president, who 
enjoys so many other means to obtain the same information from agencies, no-
tably through political appointees and OIRA review. Through political ap-
pointments, presidents can ensure that central decision makers within agencies 
are unlikely to adopt policies that diverge greatly from their preferred policies. 
Political appointees also serve as bureaucratic informants who reduce the in-
formational advantages of the agencies. Likewise, through a series of executive 
orders, presidents have effectively set up a parallel system of administrative 
law, imposing centralized review system on agencies designed to keep abreast 
of the federal bureaucracy.149 OIRA itself also reviews entries that agencies 
submit for the Unified Agenda. These schemes make it less likely that agencies 
could surprise presidents with fully-formed regulations written after secret ne-
gotiations with select interests. 
                                                          
148 Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and Agency Preferences, 
16 POL. ANALYSIS 3, 4-5 (2008). 
149 Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 
37-39 (1944). 
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*** 
In short, the empirical findings above highlight the magnitude of what, un-
til now, has been limited evidence that agencies are not complying with the re-
quirements of the Unified Agenda. Specifically, our data reveal that agencies 
only disclose about 28 percent of their proposed rules before they are promul-
gated. The remaining rules are sprung on the public for the first time in the 
Federal Register, after which little can substantially change in the final rule un-
less it is a “logical outgrowth” of the original proposals.150 It is true that many 
of the undisclosed rules are minor in nature, but our data show that about 25 
percent of OIRA-designated significant rules are also likely to go unreported. 
Equally importantly, the data also suggest that such behavior is strategic with 
respect to congressional, but not presidential, oversight. These findings corrob-
orate other empirical work suggesting that agencies time the release of their de-
cisions for when Congress is out of session.151 Thus, despite congressional and 
executive efforts to foster greater transparency for regulatory development, 
agencies are evading legislative supervision. Consequently, the Unified Agenda 
does not provide the public with the notice necessary to participate fully in the 
rulemaking process. 
At the same time, it is important to acknowledge that our findings cannot 
rule out some alternative explanations for these results. It is possible, for exam-
ple, that at least some of these effects are due not to strategic choices by agen-
cies under divided government, but rather to strategic choices by the president. 
Because the president appoints agency leaders and can review the Unified 
Agenda through OIRA, decisions not to disclose may reflect executive attempts 
to raise the monitoring costs of legislators or interest groups.152 In this sense, 
the Unified Agenda may reflect a presidential management strategy. Moreover, 
it is also difficult to disentangle just how much of our results, if any, are due to 
strategic behavior as opposed to responsive changes in the substance of the un-
derlying proposed rules. Our focus on the local period around a shift to divided 
government represents an effort to address this issue, but it remains true that 
when new political realities arise, agencies may eventually shift their rulemak-
ing behavior to align with those of their political overseers — say, after a 
                                                          
150 See Beerman & Lawson, supra note 55, at 894. 
151 See Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 17, at 1183. 
152 See id. at 1163, 1169-72, 1174-75. 
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change in congressional party control. Because the Unified Agenda is only pub-
lished twice a year, agencies may be unable to update their regulatory agendas 
before publishing their proposed rules. Thus, what is actually politically re-
sponsive behavior may misleadingly appear to be strategic. 
 
 
III.  IMPLICATIONS 
The analysis thus far has been focused on the causes and not the conse-
quences of transparency. The findings tell us little about important normative 
goals such as increasing public participation, much less of social welfare. Sali-
ent inquiries, perhaps to be tackled in future work, include whether greater rates 
of Unified Agenda disclosure result in regulations with greater net benefits, 
more public comments, or higher litigation probabilities. Without answers to 
these questions, the theoretical case for transparency is mixed. On the one hand, 
transparency is essential to many core democratic values: informing public de-
bate, educating citizens, and facilitating accountability within elected branches 
of government. 153 Moreover, transparency facilitates input about and criticism 
of government activities that can improve their efficiency or effectiveness.154 
Access to government data may also help inform private decision-making by 
individual consumers or industry actors.155 
At the same time, however, transparency also has potential costs. Trans-
parency could, for example, facilitate the disproportionate participation of well-
resourced groups that lobby for special-interest regulations.156 Disclosures can 
also harm national security or law enforcement interests, both of which require 
confidentiality for diplomatic or investigatory purposes. Additionally, leaked 
information may increase frivolous legal liabilities or result in unjustified repu-
tational harms.157 Alternatively, the information could encourage involvement 
from ill-informed parties who demand unproductive and resource-intensive 
meetings. Transparency could also hinder internal agency deliberations, which 
may chill the candid discussions that are necessary when dealing with particu-
                                                          
153 Fenster, 895-92 
154 Id. 
155 Id. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
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larly sensitive or highly uncertain issues.158 For example, transparency might 
undermine collegial deliberations by forcing agency officials to publicly pos-
ture during negotiations, resulting in breakdowns of the policymaking pro-
cess.159 In this manner, disclosures could end up further politicizing administra-
tive policymaking, thus harming important domestic policy objectives.  
As a result, inquiries about whether the disclosures required by the Unified 
Agenda ultimately increase social welfare or otherwise facilitate accountability 
remain open empirical questions. With that caveat in mind, this Part explores 
what steps could be taken to improve the utility of the Unified Agenda. Insofar 
as the stated objectives of the mechanism are to allow for greater participation 
and planning, the question addressed here is how the Unified Agenda might be 
reformed to better accomplish these goals.  
 
A. Legislative Reform? 
 
Given our findings that executive branch agencies are less likely to act 
strategically with respect to the President, the President has less incentive to po-
lice Unified Agenda requirements. Congressional reforms are thus more likely 
to be successful than executive branch efforts at improving pre-proposal disclo-
sure. In particular, these findings lend empirical support to recent legislative 
proposals aimed at requiring earlier public engagement from agencies. Various 
congressional committees, for example, have approved amendments to the 
APA that would mandate legally enforceable pre-notice reporting, such as ad-
vance notices of proposed rulemakings. The Early Participation in Regulations 
Act considered in the Senate, for example, would require agencies to publish 
advance notices of proposed rulemaking for all major rules, defined in part as 
those expected to have an impact of $100 million or more.160 The House of 
                                                          
158 The story of Government the Sunshine Act, for instance, is largely one of unintended consequences. The 
Act, which required agencies composed of collegial bodies to hold open meetings or public responses when 
disposing of official business, undermined the ability of agency officials to deliberate in a collegial way by 
forcing them to adopt a variety of inefficient work-arounds. See William Funk, Public Participation and 
Transparency in Administrative Law—Three Examples as an Object Lesson, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 171, 187-91 
(2009).  
159 For a seminal paper making this point, see David Stasavage, Open Door or Closed Door? Transparency 
in Domestic and International Bargaining, 58 INT’L ORG. 667 (2004).  
160 S.1820, Early Participation in Regulations Act of 2015, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-
congress/senate-bill/1820/text 
 42 
 
Representatives also recently passed the Regulatory Accountability Act, which 
similarly requires agencies to issue an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
for important rules, including basic information that resembles what agencies 
would include in the Unified Agenda.161 Unlike the Unified Agenda, however, 
this early warning procedure would be judicially reviewable to the same extent 
as the other APA rulemaking procedures. 
While partisan wrangling is likely to prevent these bills from passing,162 its 
plausible viability spurred eighty-four law professors to pen a letter urging the 
House to vote against the bill.163 With respect to the advance notice require-
ment, the letter argued that there was “no justification” for the requirement, 
since the existing requirement for agencies to submit regulatory agendas con-
tained much of the same information. However, our findings suggest that this 
assumption is questionable and, that agencies are acting strategically with re-
spect to congressional oversight. Such findings could thus bolster the wisdom 
of statutory advance notice requirements. 
That said, a judicially reviewable requirement to issue a pre-proposal no-
tice raises several countervailing concerns. For instance, an obvious worry is 
that an agency that faces a pressing public policy problem may not be able to 
both respond to the problem in a timely way and signal its regulatory intent in 
advance of the proposed rule. One solution to this problem, however, is to pro-
vide for a “good cause” exemption from the requirement to issue a pre-notice 
notice, with the exemption itself subject to judicial review. Another concern is 
that additional rulemaking requirements would unduly ossify the regulatory 
process.164 Though rigorously studying the hypothesis is difficult,165 existing 
                                                          
161 See Final Vote Results for Roll Call 28, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2015/roll028.xml. 
162 Of the 250 votes in favor, all but 8 came from Republicans; all 175 nays came from Democrats. See id. 
Indeed, since the 112th Congress (2011-2013), we count numerous congressional efforts to revise the APA or 
otherwise create new procedures for agencies to follow. See, e.g., Regulations from the Executive in Need of 
Scrutiny Act of 2011 (REINS Act), H.R.10, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulatory Accountability and Economic 
Freedom Act of 2012, H.R.4116, 112th Cong. (2012); Closing Regulatory Loopholes Act of 2011, S.1530, 
112th Cong. (2011); Financial Regulatory Responsibility Act of 2011, S.1615, 112th Cong. (2011); Regulato-
ry Accountability Act of 2011, H.R.3010, S.1606, 112th Cong. (2011); Sound Regulation Act of 2014, 
S.2099, 113th Cong. (2014); Achieving Less Excess in Regulation and Requiring Transparency (ALERRT 
Act), H.R.2804, 113th Cong. (2014). 
163 The Regulatory Accountability Act of 2015, H.R. 185, 114th Cong. (2015). 
164 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 
1385 (1992). 
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efforts to examine this hypothesis have at least suggested that rulemaking con-
tinues at a good rate despite the imposition of such procedural requirements.166 
Congress could also reassert its ability to monitor regulatory development 
through statutory amendment in other ways. For instance, Congress could pare 
back the common law gloss applied by courts requiring a “logical outgrowth” 
between the proposed and final rules, and thus help to reassert the notice-giving 
function of the proposed rule. Doing so would ease the pressure on the Unified 
Agenda to serve the same purpose. Courts have been using the logical out-
growth doctrine to police a significant concern — the worry that final rules will 
be imposed in ways that could not be anticipated by would-be commenters. The 
concern is that agencies could keep their intended rules under wraps while pro-
posing something only tenuously related to what they plan to release as the fi-
nal rule.167 
At the same time, however, overly-aggressive attempts to enforce this 
connection will discourage agencies from learning from public comments and 
responding accordingly. As it stands, some have rightly pointed out that the 
logical outgrowth requirement is in tension with the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council.168 There, the Court held that procedural requirements must come from 
the Constitution, from a statute, or from the agency itself.169 Vermont Yankee 
thus prohibits courts from inventing and imposing their own novel procedural 
requirements — a proscription that has been recently reaffirmed by the Su-
preme Court.170 
                                                                                                                                             
165 The clear difficulty is that it is not obvious how to think about the counterfactual baseline. That is, we 
observe agencies produce X number of rules, but we have no credible way to determine how many rules 
would have been produced absent the relevant rulemaking requirements. 
166 See Yackee & Yackee, supra note 31, at 1415 (concluding that “evidence  that  ossification  generally  is  
either  a  serious  or widespread  problem  is  mixed  at  best,  and  appears  relatively  weak  overall”); Jason 
Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative  Procedures and  Bureaucratic  Performance:  Is  Fed-
eral  Rule-making  “Ossified”?,  20  J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY  261,  261–62,  268–80  (2010)  (finding  
little  evidence  of  ossification  using  dataset ranging  from  1983  to  2006). 
167 See Beermann & Lawson, supra note 57, at 895. 
168 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.435 U.S. 519 (1978), See Beerman & 
Lawson, supra note 57 at 898-99. 
169 Vt. Yankee, 435 U.S. at 518-19, 524.  
170 See Perez v. Mort. Bankers, Ass’n., 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1207 (2015)(overruling the paralyzed veteran doc-
trine on the grounds that it was “contrary to the clear text of the APA’s rulemaking provisions, and it improp-
erly imposes on agencies an obligation beyond the ‘maximum procedural requirements’ specified in the 
APA”) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U. 
S. 519, 524 (1978)). 
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Applying Vermont Yankee to the logical outgrowth doctrine highlights the 
doctrine’s tenuous foundations against the backdrop of the APA.171 By requir-
ing agencies to provide what amounts to the actual terms or substance of the 
rule, as well as supporting evidence justifying them, courts have arguably ex-
panded rulemaking requirements beyond the text of the APA itself. Instead, 
Congress could clarify that agencies should only be required to provide a de-
scription of the regulatory issues under consideration, rather than the precise 
text of the regulation or the substance of every regulatory detail at the proposal 
stage. Otherwise, the prevailing reading of Section 553 effectively reads out the 
“subjects and issues” alternative that Congress made available to agencies. 
Reestablishing this more minimal notice requirement would restore the function 
of the notice and comment process as a forum for genuine regulatory develop-
ment with the broader public. Doing so could ameliorate the problems of politi-
cal oversight that our empirical results identify. 
 
B. Persisting Puzzles 
While some of the above reforms could help Congress reestablish a tool 
for earlier legislative and public regulatory involvement, two related puzzles — 
raised, but not resolved here — remain. The first is why Congress has yet to 
pass any of the many bills requiring some kind of reviewable pre-proposal noti-
fication. The second is why Congress passed the Regulatory Flexibility Act re-
quiring regulatory agendas for small business interests without making the 
mandate judicially enforceable. The two inquiries are related in that they raise 
the broader question of whether Congress possesses the incentive and institu-
tional capacity, going forward, to impose legal costs for agency failures to dis-
close. 
One potential explanation for the persisting lack of a legally enforcea-
ble agenda requirement is simply that of legislative naiveté. Perhaps statutory 
                                                          
171 Consider the sparse text of the APA: to promulgate rules, agencies must publish in the Federal Register a 
“general notice of proposed rulemaking” that includes (1) “a statement of the time, place, and nature of public 
rule making proceedings”; (2) “reference to the legal authority under which the rule is proposed”; and (3) 
“either the terms or substance of the proposed rule or a description of the subjects and issues involved.” 
Agencies must then give the public an opportunity to publicly comment on the proposal, after which they 
must publish a “concise general statement of . . . basis and purpose” with the final rule. In this manner, the 
APA’s text imposes minimal requirements on the agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking. That notice must 
only contain either the “terms or substance” of the rule or else a mere “description of the subjects and issues 
involved.” 5 U.S.C. 553. 
 45 
 
drafters assumed that agencies would comply with the statute given the poten-
tial political costs of avoidance. Alternatively, perhaps they believed that the 
Small Business Administration would be able to vigorously enforce the re-
quirements, even without the threat of judicial review.172 Our results suggest 
that both of these assumptions have proven misplaced. Similarly, Congress may 
have also expected the mandates to be enforced by the executive branch more 
broadly, given that it had issued executive orders on the subject. However, this 
expectation preceded the rise of the apparatus of presidential review — and the 
many other avenues Presidents have to gain information about regulatory de-
velopment. Because the White House and OIRA can now retain this infor-
mation informally, the President no longer needs to enforce the Unified Agenda 
requirements to meet his informational needs. 
Another possible account for why agenda requirements remain under-
enforced relates to technological limitations. Recall that the Unified Agenda is 
currently required to be published semi-annually, likely due in part to the costs 
of executive branch coordination, as well as those associated with printing and 
publication. As a result, the original drafters of these requirements may have 
considered a legally enforceable disclosure requirement to be impractical given 
the realities of rulemaking. Some regulations must be formulated and issued in 
less than six months due to exigent circumstances.173 Thus, it would unduly tie 
the hands of regulators to require pre-proposal notice a half year in advance.   
Considered dynamically, however, it is still curious why this state of af-
fairs has persisted, that is, why has Congress not acted in the face of agency 
non-compliance to reassert the public’s ability to monitor regulatory develop-
ment? The empirical results here suggest that perhaps Congress already has 
some of the regulatory information it desires: about three-quarters of the most 
significant regulations from executive branch agencies are disclosed. But this 
still leaves a quarter of significant regulations as well as an indeterminate num-
ber of important rules from independent agencies off the legislative radar.  
It is also possible that — for the swathe of rules not reported in the 
Agenda — Congress is content to conduct oversight after the agency has prom-
                                                          
172 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 602(b) (“Each regulatory flexibility agenda shall be transmitted to the Chief Counsel 
for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration for comment, if any.”). 
173 Id. at §602(c) (“Nothing in this section precludes an agency from considering or acting on any matter not 
included in a regulatory flexibility agenda, or requires an agency to consider or act on any matter listed in 
such agenda.”). 
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ulgated the notice. However, this view ignores the hardening of the notice of 
proposed rules under the logical outgrowth and other doctrines, so that it is dif-
ficult for agencies to revise proposed rules once published. Of course, agencies 
might withdraw a proposed rule, revise it, and re-propose it. But all of this is 
costly relative to simply influencing the agency to revise the rule prior to the 
time it is proposed, when the agency might be more susceptible to congression-
al prodding. Thus, as stressed by McNollGast,174 for legislators to be success-
ful, it is important that they intervene early in the rulemaking process, before 
coalitions have mobilized in support of the agency’s rule.  
Accordingly, another hypothesis worth considering — the simplest, and 
perhaps most correct — is that revision to administrative procedures is effec-
tively precluded by legislative gridlock. Under prevailing legislative conditions, 
a substantial majority of members might prefer to enact revisions to the APA, 
only to have their wishes frustrated by any one of the many veto points in the 
legislative process. Indeed, one substantial veto point is the President himself, 
who is unlikely to accede to revisions that curtail his authority or discretion. 
This is particularly true as the President can now avail himself of modern tools 
of executive control and review, many of which did not exist when Congress 
originally drafted and subsequently revised the APA.  
Insofar as partisan gridlock is likely to persist — likely, in our view — 
then perhaps other institutions like the Administrative Conference of the United 
States (ACUS) are better-positioned to nudge reforms on behalf of the public 
more generally. Indeed, ACUS has recently proposed a number of sound rec-
ommendations regarding the Unified Agenda, including suggestions that agen-
cies engage in more automatic, real-time reporting on their websites as well as 
other digital media.175 Such reforms would help to ameliorate the ability of 
agencies to cite publication delays as a pretext for non-disclosure. Because of 
its unique role in “bridging” internal agency actors with external parties, ACUS 
                                                          
174 McNollgast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments, supra note 33, at 258 (stressing that procedures 
“ensure that agencies cannot secretly conspire against elected officials by presenting them with a fait accom-
pli, that is, a new policy with already mobilized supporters”); McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 
31, at 441 (noting that “when an agency presents politicians with a fait accompli, politicians may find it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to respond”). 
175 See Admin. Conf. of U.S., Promoting Accuracy and Transparency in the Unified Agenda: Administrative 
Conference Recommendation 2015-1, 
https://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Unified%20Agenda%20Recommendation%20FINAL_0.
pdf. 
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may help to facilitate changes from within agencies, should legislative or exec-
utive efforts fall short.176 
 
CONCLUSION 
Some of the most critical decisions during the regulatory process are made 
before the agency issues its proposed rule. Yet scholars and the public alike 
know relatively little about this period. This Article has examined the largely 
voluntary pre-notice disclosures contained in the Unified Agenda and found ev-
idence of politically strategic behavior. Agencies, and executive agencies in 
particular, notably decrease their reporting rates in periods of divided govern-
ment — periods in which they likely face a hostile congressional oversight en-
vironment. Agencies indeed appear to play “hide and seek” with the most im-
portant pre-notice disclosure regime currently available. The results are 
noteworthy because they suggest that Congress is currently hobbled in its abil-
ity to monitor and influence agencies’ regulatory development. The findings are 
also meaningful given that common law amendments to the APA have con-
strained the ability of agencies to revise proposed rules once they appear in the 
Federal Register.  
This Article has thus identified some ways to help restore the function of 
public comment as a genuine opportunity for transparent regulatory develop-
ment. Specifically, Congress could amend the APA to create legally binding 
pre-notice disclosure requirements. These provisions could, for example, re-
quire agencies to report impending rules to the Unified Agenda or issue ad-
vance notice of proposed rulemakings subject to judicial review. Alternatively, 
statutory reforms could pare back the logical outgrowth requirement or refine it 
in ways that reduce the incentive for agencies to issue near-final rules as pro-
posed rules. Ultimately, however, we acknowledge that the theoretical norma-
tive case for transparency is ultimately a mixed one. There is thus a need for 
further empirical work regarding the extent to which disclosure affects various 
regulatory outcomes.  
Additional research questions remain. Future work, for example, could 
extend the insights developed here to agency behavior with respect to final 
                                                          
176 See Gillian E. Metzger, Administrative Law, Public Administration, and the Administrative Conference of 
the United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 1517, 1536 (2015). 
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rules: what factors explain an agency’s decision to disclose its plans to finalize 
a rule and how do these dynamics differ from the pre-proposal context given 
that the proposed rule has already been published? In a similar spirit, what con-
sequences flow from being included or excluded from the Agenda, either at the 
proposal or final stage? Do excluded rules have different fates in congressional 
hearings, or in post-finalization litigation? Does the content of the rules them-
selves depend on whether they are included in the Agenda? Other important in-
quiries are the extent to which independent agency reporting may differ from 
that of executive agencies, particularly with respect to its most important regu-
lations. Finally, it may also be interesting to consider how agencies engage sub-
stitute mechanisms of disclosure such as their own websites, published requests 
for information, or announcements at public meetings or conferences.    
How agencies disclose their regulatory activities has important implica-
tions for a number of administrative law’s animating concerns: who gets access 
to the rulemaking process, how agencies are held accountable, and which insti-
tutions are best situated to police regulatory behavior. With a new dataset, this 
Article has undertaken an empirical examination of how agencies report their 
rulemaking plans and found evidence suggesting that such behavior may be 
strategic. The results suggest a form of bureaucratic autonomy meriting closer 
examination by scholars and political overseers alike.     
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Source: Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Reginfo.gov, 
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201510&RIN=09
10-AG09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B: DATA COLLECTION 
 
This appendix describes our data collection efforts in more detail. In es-
sence, the basic exercise involves (a) developing a universe of proposed rules 
culled from the Federal Register; (b) creating a database of entries in the Uni-
fied Agenda; and (c) finding a way to map between the two datasets. 
After collecting machine-readable Federal Register entries from a variety 
of sources, we first searched the action headings to remove “false” proposed 
rules, that is, entries with variations of “proposed” in the title but that had virtu-
ally no regulatory effect. These false positives included, for example, notices of 
proposed hearings or public meetings, technical corrections of proposed rules, 
and the like. To corroborate this effort, we also tasked research assistants with 
reviewing two hundred randomly selected entries from our dataset by hand. 
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This exercise suggested that the vast majority of the entries in our dataset in 
fact represented proposed rules. Of the two hundred entries, the research assis-
tants coded only five as being something other than a proposed rule. Based on 
these numbers, we estimate that 97.5 percent of the entries in our Federal Reg-
ister dataset capture proposed rules, with a standard error on this estimate of 1.1 
percentage points (implying a 95 percent confidence interval of 95.3 percent to 
99.6 percent). Without, in addition, attempting to find proposed rules errone-
ously excluded from our dataset based on action headings, this suggests that our 
dataset erroneously includes some 4.7 percent of its entries; that is, that some 
4.7 percent of the entries in our dataset are not proposed rules for which we 
should expect to find a Unified Agenda entry. These false inclusions will gen-
erally lead us to underestimate the reporting rate. However, the magnitude of 
this bias is not large. Conservatively using the lower bound of the confidence 
interval above, this exercise suggests we underestimate the reporting rate by 4.9 
percent (i.e., 1-1/.953). That is, for example, if our estimated reporting propor-
tion is 0.25, we can conservatively bound the true reporting proportion at 0.26 
(i.e., .25*1.049). 
For the Unified Agenda database, we rely on XML files provided by the 
Regulatory Information Service Center (RISC) within the General Services 
Administration. A single rule might have numerous entries in the Agenda, for 
example, one for the proposed rule, one for the final rule, and one as a complet-
ed action report. For most of the identifying information, we retain the last 
available entry for each rule, where the rule is traced through its Regulation 
Identifier Number (RIN). According to RISC, a “RIN consists of a 4-digit 
agency code plus a 4-character alphanumeric code, assigned sequentially when 
a rulemaking is first entered into the database, which identifies the individual 
regulation under development.”177 The last available entry in the Unified Agen-
da is likely to contain the most information about the rule’s Federal Register ci-
tations, up-to-date abstracts of the rule, and the like. 
Creating a mapping between these two datasets — the Federal Register da-
taset of proposed rules and the set of Unified Agenda entries — posed consid-
erable challenges. The most obvious candidate for a mapping between them is 
through the RIN, which should in theory be a unique identifier that would allow 
us to trace the lifecycle of a rulemaking. However, while the UA fairly consist-
ently contains RINs, most entries in the Federal Register do not report them. In-
                                                          
177 http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/UA_HowTo.jsp 
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stead, Federal Register entries tend to include docket numbers, if they include 
any identifier. But these docket numbers may change over the life course of a 
rule. Moreover the UA only lists docket numbers in a highly inconsistent and 
incomplete fashion. Thus, while we use RINs to match entries where agencies 
report them, we also needed to develop an alternative mapping strategy. 
The most attractive alternative is based on Federal Register citations. Part 
of the information reported in the UA is a citation to the Federal Register entry 
for each reported action, though many UA entries were missing these citations. 
When available, we use the Federal Register citation listed for the NPRM in the 
UA to match the UA to the population of NPRMs. The combination of RIN-
based matching and this approach produce a match for approximately 20,000 
UA entries in our population of roughly 27,000 UA entries that list a NPRM. 
As a result, after this first approach to matching, we have some 7,000 “orphan” 
UA entries, which the UA lists a NPRM as an action for the rule, but for which 
we have no corresponding match in the Federal Register dataset. Generally, this 
lack of a match seems to result from incomplete data: not infrequently, as men-
tioned, the UA does not list a Federal Register cite at all. Other times, the Fed-
eral Register cite is erroneous (e.g., it lists a “7” instead of a “1” for a page 
number). Still other times, the entry may be more phantom than orphan: for ex-
ample, the agency may not end up in fact issuing a NPRM. 
We have examined a number of approaches to dealing with these orphan 
entries, but they all involve considerable error. As such, the main results we re-
port in the main body exclude the orphan entries. That said, the most promising 
approach we did find involves relying on the descriptions of the rules contained 
in the UA and Federal Register. First, we extract the “abstract” (Unified Agen-
da) or “summary” (Federal Register) information from the two datasets. These 
short descriptions generally consist of roughly 100-300 words that state the es-
sence of what the agency is accomplishing in the rule. We also considered us-
ing the rule titles, but in practice found them often not sufficiently informative. 
Second, we tokenize, stem, and vectorize the text in these fields in the 
standard fashion. Tokenization involves taking a string of text and separating it 
into a set of words. Stemming involves taking the words, or tokens, and group-
ing them into lexemes, or more basic lexical units. For example, the words 
“sit,” “sits,” and “sitting” all belong to the same basic lexical unit. Finally, vec-
torization involves representing the stemmed tokens for a given string as a nu-
meric vector, where each position in the vector encodes a specific stemmed to-
ken, and all stemmed tokens in the more general body of the text (here, rule 
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abstracts and summaries) have a designated position in the vector. For example, 
if the string in question contained the word, “sit,” the vector would take “1” in 
the position for that word; if the string in question did not have the word, “sit,” 
the vector for that string would take a “0” in the same position.178 
Third, we calculate the cosine similarity, a standard metric of the distance 
between two vectors, between each orphaned UA entry and every entry in the 
Federal Register dataset that (a) was issued in the same month as the UA action 
report indicates the NPRM was issued, (b) does not already have a UA match 
based on citations. We then retain the top 10 matches for further investigation. 
The cosine similarity between two vectors is given by (A∙B)/(||A||||B||), and 
ranges in this context between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating more simi-
larity between the two vectors. We then match each orphaned UA entry to the 
to the Federal Register entry for which it has the highest similarity; if two UA 
entries both match to the same Federal Register entry, the winner is the UA en-
try with the higher similarity score, and we then rely on the second-highest 
score for the loser; and so on. We discard any match with a similarity score of 
less than some threshold. If the threshold is set at 0.1, for example, this ap-
proach produces roughly another 5,000 matches, so that after including these 
additional matches, we find a pairing for roughly 25,000 of the 27,000 entries 
in the UA that list a NPRM as a relevant action.  
While this approach was better than other alternatives, we ultimately did 
not feel confident in the matches generated. Thus, our main results exclude 
matches generated through this procedure, though we offer it here mainly as a 
possible step towards a future refinement of the dataset. Regardless, we will 
make the results that incorporate these matches available upon request. Qualita-
tively, they resemble the results reported above. 
Finally, after creating a mapping between the two datasets, we must then 
determine whether the Unified Agenda entry precedes the appearance of the 
proposed rule in the Federal Register. We do so by comparing the date of the 
Unified Agenda in which the rule made its first appearance, to the date the 
agency published the proposed rule in the Federal Register. More specifically, 
we identify the first time that the rule appeared in the Agenda using the RIN to 
                                                          
178 For more on the statistical processing of text, see, e.g., CHRISTOPHER D. MANNING AND HINRICH 
SCHUTZE, FOUNDATIONS OF STATISTICAL NATURAL LANGUAGE PROCESSING (1999).  
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trace the rule, and then associate that Agenda publication with the date it ap-
peared in the Federal Register. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX C: AGENCY CODES 
 
TABLE A1.  Key for Agency Codes  
Abbreviation Full Name 
Agriculture Department of Agriculture 
BOP Bureau of Prisons 
CFTC Commodity Futures Trading Commission* 
Commerce Department of Commerce 
CPSC Consumer Product Safety Commission* 
Defense Department of Defense 
DHS Department of Homeland Security 
Education Department of Education 
Energy Department of Energy 
EPA Environmental Protection Agency 
FCA Farm Credit Administration 
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FCC Federal Communications Commission* 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation* 
FED Federal Reserve* 
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission* 
FHLBB Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
FMC Federal Maritime Commission* 
FTC Federal Trade Commission* 
GAO Government Accountability Office 
GSA General Services Administration 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development 
Int'l Trade Commission International Trade Commission 
Interior Department of Interior 
Justice Department of Justice 
Labor Department of Labor 
NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission* 
NUCA National Credit Union Administration 
OPM Office of Personnel Management 
Other Residual category 
PBGC Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation 
RRB Railroad Retirement Board 
SBA Small Business Administration 
SEC Securities and Exchange Commission* 
SSA Social Security Administration 
State Department of state 
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Transportation Department of Transportation 
Treasury Department of Treasury 
USPS United States Postal Service 
VA Veterans Administration 
 
* Denotes an “independent” agency, as classified in the Paperwork Reduction 
Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5). 
 
 
